Election danger
Internationa/ Viewpoint #259 September 1994 knew that the moment of the revolution had not yet come, and one year after there was the electoral explosion of the far right. I think that we have not been capable, above all at the social level of the crisis in the cities, of taking on board the experiences at the base. The question is now how to stop the far right becoming spokesperson of the excluded, because the far right is going to take positions of defence on certain social gains, things which have been achieved through struggle. One cannot think in Italy in terms of the Popular Front, that is everyone together against the fascists. We should be capable of putting together all kinds of experiences of selfmanagment. Ten days ago in Rome a national assembly was organised attended by all the trade union base committees (Cobas), the RDB, a trade union of firefighters employed in the public sector, the CUB which is a trade union coordination of self-organisation, and other smaller groups like the anarcho-syndicalists with representatives from the alternative radio associations, students from several university women's groups and people with very many other experiences.
A proposal was made that a demonstration be organised for September for the right to work, reduction in the working day without loss of salary, socially useful work in the city, time for work and time for rest. In this assembly political organisations like the Party of Communist Refoundation (PRC) were also involved, and all signed a petition to appeal for this initiative. Apart from the social question one must take up also the question of anti-fascism. Whereas in France the question of citizenship is raised not only in relation to immigration, which is not enormous in Italy, but also the possibility of neighbourhoods taking decisions, to make citizens participants in the political process. Today the far right gives identity but also a means of participating in a certain manner in com* munity life. We must be there also and I think that we can unify the left around this project to retake the intiative from the far right. Otherwise the left will disappear and there is no guarantee that some of its forces will not go over to the right.*
GERMANY's "super-election" in October could see various far-right and even fascist parties entering assemblies at regional and national level. The left have launched camapigns to oppose this danger but there is still an overall lack of perspectives for the anti-fascist/anti-racist struggle. DAVID MULLER *
M ANY people on the
left expected re-unification to be followed by a rise in social struggles. This assumption was not without foundation but overall it proved false. The main reason for the failure of the various predicted hot autumns, springs and summers to appear was the racist tide which swept across Germany.
When the Christian Democratic Union/Christian (CDU/CSU) campaign against the right of asylum began, it had already become clear that the East was not starting on a radiant future under capitalism. The sections of the state bureaucracy tied to the CDU and CSU were horrified by the possibility of electoral successes by the Social Democratic Party (SPD), Greens and even the former Communist Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS). Their horror had quite straightforward material reasons — fewer votes, fewer jobs. On top of this, wide sections of the middle classes, who have a direct influence on the policies of the CDU/CSU, had and still have a hysterical fear of strike movements, as in times of crisis their businesses are unable to meet wage demands. This layer not only gave massive support to the policies of the Federal government over asylum; in some cases they took the initiative. For example, in Han Munden (Lower Saxony) the town's biggest businessmen were behind a "citizens' initiative" against a refugee hostel.
However, large-scale capital was more hesitant, having a more realistic appreciation of the likely success of the East German strike wave. Nor did it have much to fear from the possibility of a new government centred on the SPD. Furthermore, it also knew that any campaign against refugees would also affect immigrants, who often provided much of the workforce in large factories.
It is, of course, the attitude of the police and courts which has been the most appaling. No serious attempt has been made to break up the fascist networks. Indeed, they have often acted according to the view that left and right extremists are the same". Fascist attacks are played down as the work of isolated individuals while left-wing activists have faced a far harder response. In Munich, the alleged purchase of an alarm clock was enough to warrant a conviction for "supporting or promoting a terrorist association (art. 129a (3))." Again, there is a material reason for this. In the event of a fascist take-over few judges and police officers would lose their jobs. On the other hand, if socialists were to take power they would lose their privileges.
### Terrorist
At the beginning of the 1980s, when fascist groups such as the National Socialist Alliance/National Activist (ANS/NA) and the "Wehrsportsgruppe Hoffman" carried out terrorist acts, there was a clamp down, but it never went far enough. Today, matters have worsened. The swift release of the responsible editors of Einblick, the paper of the AntiAntita which has carried out attacks on a very wide range of anti-fascist organisations, and the acquittal on 11 February 1994 of two skinheads who had murdered a disabled person, for "lack of proof", are but two examples which show that much of the legal system downplats the fascist threat. The murder and terrorising of immigrants, asylum seekers, the disabled and left wingers are seen in these circles as trivial offences.
These are signs of a frightening lurch to the right in ruling circles in preparation for larger confrontations with the working class - a clear indication
* The author is a German supporter of the Fourth International. The article was originally published in the German Fourth Internationalist journal Avanti, no. 38, March 1994. It has been specially updated for International Viewpoint.
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International Viewpoint #259 September 1994 that at least part of the state apparatus does not want to move against these fascist groups, even when clearly they are going beyond their earlier function of preparing the ground for bourgeois policy.
This trend is even clearer in the police. They have passively watched every pogrom, and instead attacked anti-racists. On 11 February this year police brutally attacked a demonstration against a visit by the leader of the Republikaner, Schönhuber, to Hannover. Despite orders to back off, mounted police charged the demonstration without warning. Such freelancing is not the rule, but it represents a disturbing trend.
Police officers are not machines simply carrying out orders. Their consciousness is determined by their material existence. The specific structures of the repressive apparatuses almost compel the appearance of a mentality close to fascism — the police officer has to obey his superiors but he can also push around those within his own power. On top of this is the crisis of legitimacy of the bourgeois democratic system, known in Germany as Parteiverdrossenheit — "feeling sick of parties". It is therefore no surprise that the social democratic expert on fascism, Leggewie, was not allowed to carry out an investigation into far right tendencies in the police in the Baden-Württemberg (the pro-Republikaner sympathies of many police officers are an open secret). Again, it is no surprise that the police take no measures to stop even the worst outbreaks of fascist violence or the formation of terrorist networks such as the Anti-Antifa.
This rightward drift in the bourgeois spectrum has facilitated the strengthening of far right and fascist forces. These could become an independent factor, in the West in elections, in the East
Fascists in Europe are gaining in influence once again - but their real aims, like their post-war symbol (right), remain the same 14 on the streets, and even take the first steps on the road to power.
Unlike the left, the radical right in Germany can look back on an unbroken tradition. This is not only a matter of the mass entry of former Nazi officials into the state of the Federal Republic. Outright fascist organisations and cadre have persisted. The Sozialistiche Reichspartei — later (ineffectually) banned - provided Nazis with their first meeting place in the 1950s. In the 1960s and 1970s, the leading force in the far right camp was the National Democratic Party (ND), but the failure of two of its major offensives led to splits. At the end of the 1960s the NPD operated mainly in the electoral arena but lost much of its support to the CDU/CSU camp. In the mid-1970s the NPD became more militant. There were, in particular, a series of shows of force by the NPD youth despite protests from democratic and socialist opinion. However, despite enjoying massive police protection, each of their street marches ended in battles. These actions undermined the NPD's "law and order" image and it rapidly lost influence.
### Ideology
At the same time, new currents developed among militant Nazis, in particular around Michael Kühnen, including the New Right at the ideological level and the National Revolutionary current. At first both of these tried to make inroads into leftist circles, targeting especially the peace movement and in some places the Greens. The National Revolutionaries adopted a pseudo-revolutionary discourse while the New Right put forward refurbished racial theories, no longer talking of the "superiority of the Germanic/ Aryan race", but rather a theory of "to each people its homeland" - the Germans had Germany, the Turks Turkey, the Nicaraguans Nicaragua and so on. On this basis they demanded the "liberation of Germany from US and Soviet imperialism" and supported the liberation struggle in Nicaragua.
However, results were limited. The terrorist strategy by parts of the National Revolutionary camp failed. Further, their distance from the traditional fascist organisations, the NPD and German Peoples Union (DVU), was clear. Contacts were always retained but at the beginning the orientation of the National Revolutionaries was certainly towards the left.
In the early and mid-1980s the old and new far right moved closer together. The old adopted the new-style racial theories and stepped up their social demagogy. In the other direction, many National Revolutionaries abandoned their rejection of the Hitlerite tradition in German fascism and participated decisively in the campaign to deny the Nazi crimes.
Fascism's scope for action in West Germany was thereby hugely increased. The New Right's ideologies opened up opportunities in university circles. Increased emphasis on social questions made it possible to gain influence in the working class.
But, most importantly, Michael Kühnen succeeded in the late 1970s and 1980s in building a stable cadre of fascist militants. These people, initially organised in the ANS/NA, today play leading roles in the most militant Nazi groups. They were able to ride out relatively well the shift to terrorism at the start of the 1980s and the banning of the ANS/NA which led to most of Kühnen's cadre moving to the previously insignificant Freedom Workers' Party (FAP). This cadre does not have its origins in Hitler's Nazi party and marked itself off from the ageing networks of the old right. This leading layer on the far right is a product of the 1970s, whereas on the left it is from 1968 or before.
The breakthrough for the neo-Nazis came with re-unification. Their tightlyknit structures, activism and base amongst working class youth made them well equipped to act in the social desert of the East. In the West, with its strongly-rooted parliamentary system, the
1. Michael Kühnen was a central leader of the militant fascist movement from the 1970s onwards until his death in 1992. A former professional soldier, he was principally an organiser, who was particularly responsible for the growth of fascist groups in eastern Germany following re-unification.
International Viewpoint #259 September 1994 promotion of fascist policies took place through the electoral successes of the Republikaner and "Liste-D". The former, incidentally, should be characterised as a far right party with a solid base amongst lower ranking civil servants and the police. Since their poor results in the European elections their influence has declined dramatically and it is unlikely that either "Liste-D" or NPD will be able to fill the gap. For the moment, the Republikaner are not aiming to build a militant street movement or form activist cells. But they could very well be part of an overall fascist regroupment. In any case, they form a bridge between right-wing conservatives and fascists, especially inmaking racism respectable.
With the wind of the "asylum debate" in their sails the organised fascists were able to act as a right-wing vanguard, using direct action to shift public opinion sharply to the right. Without the racist outrages in Hoyerswerda and Rostock there might well have been no compromise between the major political parties to restrict asylum. Violence against the defenceless undermined the reaction of solidarity, which many were frightened to show because this might cost something, possibly even physically. It was easier to find reasons why it was not so bad after all or even had
"unpolitical" simply reflects the low level of anti-racist awareness in Germany. Nonetheless, the impact of the "lines of light" is not to be sneered at, even if their deliberately "unpolitical" direction - Biblical quotations rather than demands — hindered further development and gave many the feeling that they "had done something " — and did not have to do anything more.
The next upsurge followed the murders in Solingen. Here Turkish immigrants predominated at the demonstrations. This presented the opportunity for a real anti-racist movement with immigrants playing a leading role (and/or organising independently). It was missed. Only in a few places, notably Hamburg and Munich, was an anti-racist united front which included the real immigrant community — and thus nationalist, religious and liberal forces — successfully created. In most cases, the attitude of the far left was that it was not possible to demonstrate against racism alongside nationalists.
The refusal to construct a common front of all those affected - excepting fascist formations such as the Turkish Grey Wolves — had precisely the opposite effect: chauvinist forces supported by the Turkish State had a free hand in many immigrant comsupport for those affected; people on the "black lists" who have been, or will be, subjected to terrorist violence. The protests must be as broadly based as possible around concrete demands and actions, such as self-defence of threatened institutions, or full information about and consistent following through of police investigations. Left wing gatherings must be better protected and security questions taken more seriously.
Since it is difficult to apprehend the terrorists themselves, after specific outrages there should be demonstrations at the addresses of the instigators and leaders: offices and business premises of the far right and fascist parties or meeting places of known neo-Nazis.
These are, of course, practical tasks. What is also required now is an open debate on how to take the anti-fascist movement forward. Above all, a new direction is needed — one which can stop the rise of the far right and the fascists in their tracks. * some justification.
Self-organisation structures, activism and
But the terror did not go unchallenged. Some 5 thousand demonstrated after the Hoyerswerda pogrom. Initially these were mainly the far left and young people. The biggest weakness of this movement was — and remains - the lack of self-organisation. There were munities.
In the immediate future, the work of the antiracist/anti-fascist movement will be shaped by the elections.
For the moment the electoral success or failure of the far right and of the East certainly impressive successes, the high point being the Bonn demonstration against the SPD's special conference on the asylum issue in November 1992, but there were no structures to facilitate ongoing work and increasing political awareness.
This meant that nothing was done to clarify the ambiguities in the "lines of light" movement. They produced impressive mobilisations in which large numbers could take part and stimulated much discussion. The "lines of light" were more than just an expression of the attitude of particular bourgeois and petty-bourgeois circles — large-scale industry, liberal intellectuals — who feared that their material interests outside Germany would be harmed or who were personally afraid of the terror. Moreover, the fact that they were so fascist parties has taken on grea ter importance. It is not that street level violence against refugees and immigrants has significantly abated but it is no longer the number one topic in German society. The elections are combined with the possibility of a renewed debate over the right to asylum, especially in Bavaria, where the CDU/CSU is set on a xenophobic election campaign — "taking fears about being swamped by foreigners seriously".
Countering the street violence and opposing the terrorist groups will of course continue, although the latter is more difficult. They are clandestine and the police are not ready to break them up. Here, the anti-racist/anti-fascist movement is seeking to build, through self-organisation, the strongest possible
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