IRELAND
In from the cold
PENNY DUGGAN
&
ROLAND WOOD take an initial look at the developments in Ireland since the IRA's cease-fire.
There will be further contributions in the coming months.
31 September 1994
F YOU turn to the back-pages of An Phoblact (Republican News) you will find an invitation to join Sinn Fein, an organisation which is "dedicated to forcing a British withdrawal from the occupied Six Counties, the reunification of our country and the establishment of a democratic socialist republic." Four frenetic weeks after the IRA cease-fire was first announced; four weeks in which we have watched "infamous" Republican political leaders come in from the cold; it is reasonable to ask how Sinn Féin's current strategy, carefully crafted over the last few years, takes them a little closer to their above stated aims? Moreover, what concretely has the oppressed nationalist community in the North gained in return for the IRA's "complete cessation of military operations"? Is the IRA's decision due simply to war-weariness and a recognition of the limits of armed struggle, or, even while we believe that the root cause of the war has always lain with the British State, is it the accumulation of serious propaganda blunders, for example the Warrington bombing (northwest England) in March 1993? Undoubtedly, both of these factors have played an important part in the decision. Yet if these were the only factors to take account of, surely a cease-fire could have been called much sooner. Clearly, it was only when the new "nationalist consensus" was finally ready to be publicly unveiled, and with it the promise of great strides forward in the struggle for national self-determination, that a cease-fire could be called. This new consensus appears to be the leitmotif of Sinn Féin's current strategy. Encompassing the South's Fianna Fail and the North's Social Democratic and Labour Party, alongside Sinn Féin, and with the added support of the Clinton administration, it is a very high risk strategy. Sinn Féin leader Pat McKeown, in an interview for International Viewpoint (pages 6-8), outlines the basis for the present consen• no internal solution to the North; • the Irish people have the right to national self-determination; • that agreement can only come when the British begin to disengage from Ireland; • and that all nationalist parties which have policy in favour of Irish unity should work together. Is this, as Sinn Féin believes, a strong foundation on which to build?
3 International Viewpoint #260 October 1994
International Viewpoint #260 October 1994
Much depends on the place the nationalist consensus plays within Sinn Féin's overall strategy, because while the minimum basis for consensus, as outlined above, would seem to favour important elements of Sinn Féin's thinking, there can be little doubt that they are only a junior partner in this alliance. Under such circumstances can Sinn Féin project an independent line, recognising that its strategy cannot be based solely on one element? Unarmed struggle In the 8 September An Phoblact, an article entitled "Objectives for the unarmed struggle" suggests that the answer is "yes", going so far as to tell us that the cease-fire will actually see an intensification of the Republican struggle. The article concludes by outlining the main axes of the movement's immediate campaigns: "• Issues of political and constitutional change. On the constitutional side, sovereignty, the end of partition, the ending of British rule in Ireland, the unionist veto, the Government of Ireland Act, all of which must be addressed if a lasting settlement is to be secured. The political shape of an agreed Ireland must also be debated, and while republicans have their own model of society, which may differ from that of other parties and which they will have to argue for, constitutional change is the prerequisite; • Issues of democratic rights. The recognition of political mandates, the end of censorship, the implementation of legislation which will effect equality in employment, the rights of Irish 4 speakers, the dismantling of repressive legislation, are not concessions sought by republicans, but democratic rights which every citizen is entitled to; "• Practical issues which in the short term will encourage the ongoing peace process. Demilitarisation on the ground includes a drop in patrols, harassment and surveillance, the re-opening of border roads. Paroles, rapatriations and release of political prisoners, an end to exclusion orders also fall into this category." Little wonder then, if mass support is to be won around these issues, that the party points to the impor tance of its accumulated political capital: a social base, even if a minority one, which has been through a very difficult twenty-five years, and while it shows understandable signs of exhaustion, has emerged undefeated. "Time to go" On 20 August, a mere eleven days prior to the IRA's declaration, 10 thousand people took to the streets of Dublin demanding peace and British withdrawal from Ireland. Organised by Sinn Féin under the auspices of the "Time for Peace — Time to Go" campaign, it was the largest expression of anti-imperialist sentiment for a number of years. In the immediate wake of the cease-fire we have witnessed a significant increase in agitation and mobilisation with regard to the withdrawal of British troops and the Unionist dominated Royal Ulster Constabulary from nationalist areas in the North; closure of military and police checkpoints; reopening of cross-border roads. If Sinn Féin can demonstrate that it retains the capacity to remobilise its social base more consistently, as an integral element of an independent line, it must not be underestimated, even while it may be accepted that at this stage its base remains rooted almost solely in the North. In the South it is virtually non-existent. Nonetheless, the construction, by Sinn Fein, of a counter-balance to the "diplomacy" of negotiations is clearly needed.
In our interview, McKeown goes further. He confirms the view that, while the nationalist consensus is important, it is not, on its own, a solution, and that there is no consensus about the kind of Ireland which the "nationalist family" want to see. Sinn Féin, McKeown reminds us, does not hide its commitment to a Thirty-two County democratic socialist republic, and that therefore a part of their current strategy will be the establishment of a Thirty-two County consensus amongst the anti-imperialist left. McKeown appeals to the Irish left, particularly those who in the past have been hostile to the armed struggle, to begin to work together with Sinn Féin, adding that "there are no excuses any more." Indeed. Yet while Mckeown himself recognises the grave weakness of Sinn Féin's own standing in the South, going so far as to describe it as "retarded", who on the anti-imperialist left is in any better condition? Social weight Clearly anti-imperialist sentiment still exists and can be mobilised. However, because the existing organised forces from which an anti-imperialist consensus could be forged are so small, there can be little doubt that, at an initial stage at least, it would have much less social weight relative to the nationalist consensus, regardless of whatever guarantees may be sought and received from Sinn Féin that it would be considered of equal importance. This is not, however, an excuse to dismiss the necessity of such a project. Rather, it is to honestly recognise that the main nucleus of
ding debonest great cease-fire, I'm just against "If they [Sinn Féin and the IRA] really do believe they [.] system to deliver, they • had better be right because can put their faith in the Bernadette Devlin McAliskey struggle for very long." if they are wrong they won't be leading the Former Mid-Ulster MP reason nor incentive for them to move beyond the laager are assured of a veto over change, then there is neither "Sinn Féin is firmly convinced that as long as Unionists Six County state demanded division for its survival. people was institutionalised by partition; the nature of the da to try to portray what is happening in the north of Ire- land as irrational sectarian strife. But the division of our "The British have spent millions of pounds in propagan- artificial majority created in 1921. ching tide of history which year by year undermines the British goverment is in power, fearful of the encroa- uncertainty, dependent upon the whims of whichever "Consequently, Unionists face a future of unremitting government, most Unionists do not trust the British. despite deals between some Unionists and the British ged in them a paranoid distrust of all nationalists. And nationalists, it has also failed Unionists. It has encoura- future. Yet, the partition of Ireland has not only failed than with the prospect of building a better, a different *THE Unionist leadership fear change, however limited They feel more secure with the failed policies of the past Unionists — Victims of their confuse the issue of consent with the upholding of a veto deciding the future of this country. But to deliberately consent, agreement and involvement of Unionists in "Sinn Féin have said that we need and want the
International Viewpoint #260 October 1994
"I'M NOT against the a re-surgent anti-imperialist left still lies in the Republican movement, and it is for this reason that wall.
over any change at all is to perpetuate division and while weaknesses are evident - for Sinn Féin and the Irish left as a whole - particularly, in relation to
*The partition of Ireland was brought about by a British the South, every move Sinn Féin act of parliament for which not a single Irish vote was cast." Sinn Féin chair Mitchell McLaughlin (from Green makes towards projecting an
Left Weekly, 14 September 1994) * independent line in the peace process and re-mobilising its social base should be supported.
At this stage there have been no concrete gains for the nationalist community, particularly in the
North, but it would be premature to deny categorically the positive psychological impact which the cease-fire has brought, enabling the Republican movement, given a steady course, to sail in a larger sea. * conflict.
5
----- pull-quotes on this page -----
own history?