From Dayton to the Elections
All-Bosnian elections are supposed to be held before the end of September. The election is a keystone of the Dayton Accords, and the first test of the post-war period. But as Catherine Samary explains, the date set has more to do with the demands of American politics than the conditions on the ground that are necessary if the vote is to be more than a charade. THE ACCORDS FORESEE THAT THE IFOR (Implementation Force, under NATO command) will withdraw at the end of December, and it is necessary for Clinton, in the US electoral context, to be able to point to a minimal degree of normalization before his "boys" withdraw. It is especially necessary to leave before the shame of a Somali-style syndrome, or, even worse, a major confrontation.
So nothing will be done (particularly the arrest of war criminals) that would put the FOR troops in a hostage situation or in the teeth of conflict. That is why it is said in Bosnia that the IFOR is UNPROFORizing (becoming like the UN command that NATO has replaced). The foreign troops are serving to ratify territorial divisions rather than unify the country.
It is difficult to imagine how the elections will be organized in this context - and when (or if they will take place. The free movement of the population is a mirage at the moment. People (including refugees abroad) theoretically have the right to vote in the localities in which they were registered in the last census in 1991. Also, all voters should be able to register in their location of choice. But even visits to cemeteries by Muslim families in Srebrenica (in the Serb Republic of Srpska) or Capljina (in the Croat region of HercegBosna) has been forbidden by the local Serb and Croat warlords who led the ethnic cleansing of these towns. The return of refugees is impossible where they are not members of the majority community.
The implicit viewpoints of the great vers converge on at least one point: if
Bosnia-Herzegovina breaks apart (and this is undoubtedly an unstated assumption of the diplomats), it should not happen before the orderly departure of the IFOR. And it should not take an explosive, uncontrolled form. This is why the US, like the European governments, based themselves in Dayton on an agreement between Serb president Milosevic and Croat president Tudjman. Their meetings, even before the war, have aimed at redefining the ethnic borders of Serbia and Croatia to the detriment of Bosnia-Herzegovina, similar to what happened in 1939.
The NATO air strikes, far from having been anti-Serb, aimed at weakening Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic to the benefit of Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic. They succeeded; the recognition of the "Serbian Republic in Bosnia" in the Dayton accords meant the defeat of Karadzic, with the return to the territorial percentages accepted in the negotiations with the aid of the Croat and Bosnian armies. Too bad for the populations that did not receive their share.
Similarly, the Croat-Muslim federation, put in place under American pressure in March 1994, aimed at equalizing the military balance of power against the Serb nationalists, mitigating the martyrdom of the Muslims attacked on two fronts, and supporting the secular and Bosnian wing of the SDA (the dominant Muslim party) against its Islamic wing that is turning toward Iran. In the context of the Croat-Muslim alliance, it is the Croat army that has received most of the American aid. But it is understood that behind the scenes in Dayton, the Sarajevo govern-
Bosnia-Herzegovina * ment was promised American logistical and military aid whose purpose, from Clinton's viewpoint, was to assure an equilibrium of forces as a condition for NATO withdrawal. But this whole arrangement is now in trouble. A fragile arrangement
Normalization for Belgrade has meant suspending the Kosovo question for the moment (2). Macedonia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) have mutually recognized each other. And the Milosevic/Tudjman agreements on border issues have somewhat stabilized the situation. The pragmatic Milosevic is therefore, more than ever, a major trump card for creating a new Balkan order. This is why all the states of the European Union have recently recognized the YFR, including Germany. The latter is particularly interested in a regional peace because of its investments, but especially to be able to send the mass of refugees from the ex-Yugoslavia, including Kosovo, back home. Milosevic should get a few Deutschmarks for this.
But even though he has thereby been able to consolidate his position and sign the Dayton accords in the name of all Serbs, Milosevic still doesn't have the elbow room to push aside Karadzic, the warlord he himself helped to power. The Serbian Republic's budget is determined in Belgrade. Milosevic still must consolidate the police forces loyal to Belgrade against those of Karadzic's army and build an electoral base for the (Bosnian Serb) Socialist Party against Karadzic's SDS. To do this, Milosevic needs the ceasefire and the time the accords allow to apply the military aspects of Dayton and reduce the size of the Bosnian Serb army (to the benefit of the police, which he controls). And he has special interest in pluralist elections in the Srpska Republic. Several dozen parties have already entered the lists, and the Socialist Party appears to be the main opposition to Karadzic's SDS. The changes in the balance of forces are also leading to differentiation inside the latter party.
Karadzic's power, privileges, freedom, and even his life are now in play. He has been too visibly enriched by the war to be popular. But if he can present himself as a martyr (a victim of the great powers or of Milosevic), he might harness some solidarity. Meanwhile, Dayton has legitimised the reason he fought
July 1996 #279 21
• Groen Links: 31.20.62.02.21.2 (ext. 207, Richard Wouters • SAP: 31.20.62.59.27.2 (Ernst van Lohuizen)
The Committee was initiated in April 1996. Members include • AMOK • ASEED Europe •Derde Kamer •
Groen Links • Nederland Bekent Kleur • PSP92 • SAP • Solidariteit • United for cultural action • Womens Global
Network for Reproductive Rights. The committee will organize its first conference on October 19th, 1996.
* Bosnia-Herzegovina
Multi-ethnic alternatives
The only currents that are effectively fighting for Bosnian unity define themselves as the
"democratic alternative."
In March 1996, some 70 representatives of political and civic formations and independent media from across Bosnia-Herzegovina
(except for Herceg-
Bosna) met in Tuzla.
They emphasized the tact that the elections foreseen for the fall of 1996 would be among the the war - his Srpska Republika in Bosnian now exists, and is recognised. The balance of forces is not in his favor, but he can carry out a policy of provocations, blocking the establishment of common institutions throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina, as specified in the Dayton accords, boycotting the elections and instigating a separatist referendum. He may even resign, if he can get serious guarantees of not having to face charges in the Hague and of having a healthy and peaceful retirement.
On the Croat-Muslim side, the situation is more problematic. By reforging the Croat army, recognizing the Serbian Republic in Bosnia and supporting the Milosevic/ Tudjman agreements, the US has in fact consolidated a dynamic toward the establishment govinian emigre who since 1992 has been directly responsible for the construction of the Croat statelet of Herceg-Bosna in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Tudjman's recent arrogance is a result of his sense of power and impunity after the ethnic cleansing of the secessionist Serbs in the Croat Krajina last summer. This military operation, committed in the shadow of the horrors in Srebenica and with the obvious agreement of Belgrade, was accompanied by an immediate change in the Croat constitution; abolishing certain amendments favorable to the Serb minority (12% of the population at that time, but less than 5% today which had been added under international pressure. Notably, this has allowed Tudjman to lower the Serb representation in parliament from 13 to three deputies. Tudjman would not have had a majority in the last opportunities to break the totalitarian logic which sees all citizens of
Towards a different Europe!
Bosnia-Herzegovina represented by the three nationalist parties and their leaders. They demanded that the electoral commission of the OSCE of Greater Croatia. The Croat defense minister, Gojko Susak, is a far right Herzelast elections without this measure, and with alternativa fonference, demonstrations guarantee all citizens the right to vote and be elected. They also demanded the creation of a common fund accessible to all duly registered parties and candidates, The Dutch Committee for a Different Europe invites you to take part in debates and actions for a and that all parties and media be able to take part in the work of the At this moment two developments are taking place that are decisive for Europe's future. electoral commission. • preparations for the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) are leading to the dismantling of
The Union of Social Democrats public services and social security and rising unemployment in almost every EU member state. (OBSD - the organization of Tuzla's • the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) has begun: the fifteen member states are negotiating mayor Selim Beslasgic) has to revise the Maastricht Treaty, the treaty that has propelled the European Union into its current proposed a regroupment of all the credibility crisis. According to plan, these negotiations are supposed to end with the signing of a new country's forces favorable to a treaty by the heads of government during their June 1997 Amsterdam summit. united and democratic Bosnia under Together the EMU and IGC will largely determine the character of the European Union and thus the slogan "Yes, For Bosnia- the daily lives of Europe's citizens. But discussion of these developments is going on mainly among Herzegovina." Five opposition politicians. For the moment there is no broad debate under way about the threats posed by European integration, like the plans for an EU defense bloc, with the "Europeanisation" of the nuclear arsenals parties (Beslagic's organization, the Social Democratic Party, the Organization of Bosnian Muslims, the Our Europe must be a Europe that carries out a strong social and environmental policy, creates Croat Peasant Party and the jobs, eliminates the democratic deficit, offers equal opportunities to women and men, safeguards the Republican Party) should soon sign rule of law, is hospitable to refugees, is open to the East and in solidarity with the South, disarms in an coalition agreement for the order to contribute to peace, and promotes sustainable development both inside and outside Europe. elections. Also possibly joining are Parallel to the June 1997 Amsterdam Summit, there will be an alternative conference, Circle 99 of Sarajevo, the Demo- demonstrations and other activities. We invite all progressive parties, groups, NGO's and others to cratic Circles of Tuzla and Bihac, the Citizens' Forums of Zenica, Tuzla and Gorazde, along with the Liberal Party of Miodrag Zivanovic in Banja Luka, and opponents of the Pale parliament like Milorad Dodik of the social, green, democratic and feminist Europe.
of France and the United Kingdom.
take part in this Summit for a Different Europe.
Get in touch!
Committee for a Different Europe, c/o A SEED Europe, P.O. Box 92066, 1090 AB Amsterdam, The Netherlands
E-mail: ander.europa@aseed.antenna.nl, Tel: 31.20.66.82.23.6 (Olivier Hoedeman, Kees Kodde, Erik Wesselius)
Party of Independent Social Democrats.
The next meeting of the "Democratic Alternative" will be in Banja
Luka. The proposed coalition is also open to Haris Sildizic's party. [CS]
You can also get information from:
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Amsterdam, June 1997
the votes of Croats in the diaspora (and in Bosnia-Herzegovina). He continues to obstruct the activities of the Hague tribunal (promoting the warlords of HercegBosna accused of war crimes in the Croat army). Tudjman's party the HDZ, purged of its most pro-Bosnian Croats in 1992) that rules in the Croat regions of Bosnia-Herzegovina. And despite the Dayton accords, which privilege the Croat-Muslim Federation, he still supports Herceg-Bosna, which rejects all commonalties with Muslims. Politics and identity in play
The Serbian and Croat approach toward Bosnia-Herzegovina has been based, since the beginning of the conflict, on one basic argument: there is no Bosnian nation; Bosnia-Herzegovina is an artificial creation of former leader Marshal Josip Tito, and so is the Muslim nationality claimed by almost half of the Republic's pre-war inhabitants. This historical view of Bosnia-Herzegovina is obviously false (3). As for the Bosnijaks identity, (the preferred term nowadays for the main Slav ethnic-national community in Bosnia, impregnated by Turkish and Islamic culture), they are no more artificial than the Croats (Catholics) or the Serbs (Orthodox); all three speak variants of Serbo-Croatian (4).
Their identity is historical, evolving, and the result of political choices. Many Serbs, Croats and Bosnijaks in Bosnia consider themselves Bosnians citizens first, and often consider themselves Yugoslav. The crisis and the war have forced new polarizations in which one's choice of identity isn't free, and depends on the type of state in which one lives. The new constitution and the coming elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina do not give an equal citizenship to Bosnians of mixed
Muslim Bosnians are polarized between those who feel themselves to be citizens of Bosnia first and vote for non-nationalist parties, those adopting a Bosnian nationalism, thus appropriating a Bosnia-Herzegovina denied them by Serb and Croat nationalism, and those whose primary identity is now Islamic (though not fundamentalist). The SDA (the dominant Muslim party) has incorporated this heterogeneity. It has two wings. The goal of one wing is the reIslamization of those Muslims who " spend more time in the bar than the mosque". SDA leader and Bosnian President Alia Izetbegovic has never hidden his clear religious beliefs. But he knows that nearly half of the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina considered themselves atheists in 1991, with only 16% of Muslims (in the national sense) practicing Islam. Many join Serbs and Croats in opposing an Muslim state.
This is why Izetbegovic constantly oscillates between two variants of the same policy: accepting the division of Bosnia and organizing a Muslim state or using the SDA and his power at the head of a secular and multi-ethnic Bosnia-Herzegovina to consolidate its Islamic component.
It has been in Izetbegovic's interest to confront strong Serb and Croat nationalist parties. This has made it easier to organize most of the population on an exclusively communitarian basis. This form of organization has a very strong tradition in the countryside, where the churches are more influential, mixed marriages are rare and the village communities are more juxtaposed than mixed.
The former prime minister, Haris Silajdzic, most incarnated the secular and pro-American wing of the SDA. This wing finds its identity in an attachment to Bosnia-Herzegovina rather than in religion. The war kept these two components of the SDA together, to demand aid from all who wished to give it. Now the party is breaking up; Silajdzic recently formed the Party for Bosnia. The moment of decision
This is a decisive moment for imperialist domination of Bosnia. During the war, the Sarajevo government sought solidarity and military and financial aid from the Islamic countries, especially Iran. The US is now seeking to conciliate the Muslim world, and is finding bridges for its own diplomacy. Peace demands a reliable power in Bosnia to assure the stability of the Croat-Muslim federation. The Islamic component of the SDA and its links to Iran have become more problematic.
In fact, their Croat allies are not without arguments on the impossibility of coexisting with the fundamentalists, and have even kept Iranian arms from reaching Sarajevo. In Mostar, the capital of Croat Herceg-Bosna, the far right Croat militias have systematically impeded the reunification of the city after destroying its Muslim section.
The Bosnian president thinks that some of the Bosnian Croats (those with the military power) do not want a federation, but he doesn't want to say this publicly. He is therefore applying a tactic of undermining the federation, until the Bosnians say they have had enough (5). And the American secret services are finding ample collaboration among the Croats to expose Iranian support to Sarajevo in terms of money, people and fighters.
All this information, revealed in the American press, has left Clinton quite nervous and particularly undiplomatic in im-
Bosnia-Herzegovina * posing his will. Imperialist activity is received more and more unhappily, even among those currents hostile to the SDA and any attempt at creating a Muslim state. The journal Dani writes: "American-Bosnian relations in regard to Iran have entered a new phase. The American ambassador Madeleine Albright has stated 'the messengers of hate must leave, whether they come from Pale or Teheran." This leaves no doubt: America wants to choose for Bosnia not only its friends, but its enemies! Such policies are not subtle... They throw a glove of provocation in the face of the victims, placing the synonym for evil (Pale) and for a friend (Teheran) as close as Washington on the same level. Beyond the naivete of its view about this friendly aid [from Iran], this crude American dictates can be described as a Haitization of Bosnia-Herzegovina, leaving few options" (Dani #14, March 1996) (6).
The US has withdrawn aid it had promised to the Sarajevo government until the departure of the last Mujahaddin (there are reportedly several dozen fighters left). The dissolution of the State Agency (Sarajevo's secret service), as demanded by both by the Croat forces and the US, is the first result obtained by Clinton.
Will the political weakening of the SDA to the benefit of Haris Silajdzic's Party for Bosnia be sufficient to stabilize the federation? This depends on the international pressure imposed on Tudjman. The recent decision to delay Croatia's entry into the Council of Europe represents a (tardy) realization of the instability produced by the policies of Greater Croatia.
The consolidation of the Federation would be a better result than an outbreak of hostilities, leaving a rump Muslim state wedged between two hostile states — fertile terrain for the growth of fundamentalism. But such consolidation will not be the signal of a refounded, multicultural Bosnia-Herzegovina based on the equality of all its peoples and all its citizens. * Notes 1) Bosnijak expresses the secular attachment of this community to Bosnia-Herzegovina as a national identity rather than one marked by religion. The term Bosnijak should be differentiated from the term Bosnian, designating all citizens of Bosnia. 2) See "La Serbie dans la tourmente de la paix", Le Monde Diplomatique, June 1996. 3) See "L'identite incertaine des Musulmans bosniaques," Maniere de voir, April 1996. 4) These are now considered three languages - Serb, Croat and Bosnian. 5) See Dani, French edition, n. 15, April 1996 6) Op. cit.
July 1996 ·279 23