Instability and lost illusions
* Russia
The first round of the Russian
Presidential elections confirms a number ot tendencies revealed during the December 1995 Parliamentary elections.
Livio Maitan
As elsewhere in Eastern Europe, but at a larger scale, there is a rejection of the regimes formed in the collapse of the bureaucratised,
VOTE BORIS transitional societies. This is the result of the prolonged economic collapse, the tearing of FOR THE SHOKT
SHARP BLOODBATH the social tissue, the inexistence of even moderately efficient and genuinely democratic institutions, the emergence of new exploitative social layers, enriching themselves by all sorts of unscrupulous, even criminal financial and commercial operations, and the impoverishment of a large majority of the population.
At the political and ideological level, this has led to a sharp decline in illusions in the virtues of the "market economy and "western democracy" and a rapid fall in the influence of those circles of intellectuals who had most contributed to nourishing such illusions.
This rejection is expressed in different, partially contradictory ways. After a few years of critical thinking and mobilisation (1987-90) the growing chaos has led to depoliticisation. This has caused both the elementary reflect of condemnation of those considered responsible for dismantling the social advantages of the previous system, coupled with frustrations about Russia's decadence, and the role which the USSR played for decades on the international scene. The nostalgia which exists is not so much for the Stalinist period (particularly the 1930s), more for the Brezhnev period, when the sclerosis of the state coincided with economic stagnation, but there was no longer massive repression, and wide layers of the population experienced a growth in living standards. This sentiment is one of the reasons which led people, particularly those of a certain age, to vote for [the Communist leader] Zuganov.
The events of the months leading up to the first round of the presidential election, and the days which followed, demonstrate the instability and the precariousness of the situation. Before last December's Duma (parliamentary) elections, Yeltsin took a series of 24 International Viewpoint measures aiming to improve, at least a little, the conditions of the social layers most heavily affected by his outrageous "neoliberalism," in the hope of increasing his share of the vote. The measures included the removal from his team of several of the individuals most closely associated with the market reforms. After the results of the first round of the presidential elections, it took Yeltsin less than 48 hours to launch his incredible co-optation of General Lebed, his principle rival after Zuganov, coupled with the demotion of a number of Lebed's opponents within the government, most notably defence minister Pavel Gratchev.
Yeltsin also used this occasion to re-integrate free-market partisans like Tchubais, who he had earlier expelled from government.
The deal between Yeltsin and Lebed, and the date at which the two men agreed to cooperate is still not clear. Lebed certainly criticised Yeltsin heavily during his campaign, but he also rejected "excessive etatism," and proposed economic policies similar to those of the President.
It is not clear how long this accord will last. Yeltsin may find Lebed's new position to be too dangerous, and seek to change the disposition of power round the throne. For his part, Lebed will certainly try to reinforce his position, so as to be able to try to succeed Yeltsin, and even accelerate the date of such a succession. Nor can we exclude the possibility that Yeltsin will make other tactical operations, for various reasons.
Zuganov's Communist Party of the Rus sian Federation (CPRF) is different from the "ex-Communist" parties which now govem in Poland and Hungary. The Russian party ha not accomplished the same process af revision and re-adjustment of its theory and politics, particularly where the past is concerned. The CPRF has an ambiguou character. It seems not to have learned some essential lessons about the failure of the bureaucratic transitional societies, and continues to seek common ground with nationalist, including far-right expressions.
Zuganov himself is ambiguous. Moscow activist Aleksander Buzgalin calls him "a melange: social democratic in economics, etatist in politics, communist-Christian orthodox in ideology, and chauvinist in geopolitics."
Having said this, if Zuganov became president, he would face similar problems to those of the ex-Communist parties now in power elsewhere in Eastern Europe. Given the current balance of forces, he would probably be pushed to make similar choices on the essential questions. Though, compared to the Polish and Hungarian parties, he might give a more important role to the state, take protectionist economic measures, and adopt a more autonomous foreign policy.
The second round of the election has not yet been held. But one thing is clear. Under Zuganov, or under Yeltsin, Russia will have neither significant economic growth, nor sociological stabilisation. *