The guerillas come out of the forest
Colombia • Ernesto Herrera
All of a sudden, the media has realised that Colombia's left- wing guerrilla movements are not dead. While they are by no means in a position to take power, the guerrilla forces of both the FARC and UCELN groups have recently demonstrated their military power, and their ability to widen their support among the poor. Tactics have included occupying urban districts, creating "liberated zones" in the countryside, harassing oil companies that refuse to pay revolutionary taxes, and even armed incursions into the capital, Bogota.
In the last months of 1996, 150 soldiers and rightist paramilitary forces were killed by fighters of the two groups, according to officia figures. The real total is probably higher. Independent sources estimate that three people die in com-
During the past five years, the FARC has doubled its forces trom 5,000 to 10,000, and doubled the number of military fronts from 47 to Just over 100.
In a communiqué sent to El Tiempo newspaper, the FARC recently announced the creation of its first "liberated zone" , in the districts of Guaviare, Meta, Caqueta, Putmayo and Amazonas.
The guerrilla don't just face the army. In the coca-growing regions, they compete with the narco-Mafia for support from the peasants. The FARC strategy has been to offer the peasants credit at provide guaranteed prices for their produce. By doing so, they prevent the narco-traffic-
Colombia tures. Today, under the leadership of Spanish-born ex-priest Manuel Perez, the 5,000 guerrillas harass the regime and oil companies on more than 20 fronts.
According to Irish Colombia specialist Daniel Davis, "The difference in the strength of the two oraanisations is explained by number of factors. One is that it is almost impossible to leave the FARC once one has joined up. In some areas, like Segovia, the more politically sophisticated UC-ELN has grown at the expense of the
BABASTA bat or massacres every day, even in "quiet" periods. Guerrilla deaths are hard to count, while the armed forces and paramilitary units consistently under-report their own
Six years after the death of leader Luis Alberto Morantes ("Jacobo Arenas) and three years after their historic 1993 conference, the FARC continues to implement its new strategy of creating "rings of pressure around the towns and Bogota itself. The idea is to go beyond the "strategic equilibrium wards what the group calls "a scenario of generalised insur-
The guerrillas aren't trying to take Bogota, with its six million inhabitants. Not yet. But they have demonstrated operational capacity in the field, which enables them to cut the country's main communications networks for a period of several hours or more. The last time they did so, "official" Colombia was effectively split into two
For most of its 40 years of existence, the FARC has given priority to the struggle in the country's rural
In 1962, the Colombian army threw 46,000 soldiers into what it thought would be an intensive, but short campaign to exterminate the rebels, who probably numbered no more than 50 at the time. Thirty years later, they were still trying kers from keeping the lion's share of ves. According to sociologist Alfredo Molano, there are many regions of "the guerrillas are the judges, and the
According Colombia's military intelligence service, the rising light in the FARC is Jorge Briceno, "the
. The son of a rank-and-file guerrilla fighter, Briceno currently directs FARC operations on its key eastern front. His base is in the Sunsapaz region, with its back to the eastern Andes range, and Bogota at its feet. Oiling the wheels of revolution
On September 20, 1996, Colombia's second most important guerrilla organisation, the UC-ELN. imposed a total ban on transport and a widespread shutdown of commercial activity. In the Cesar district, 500 km. north-west of Bogota, they ambushed a convoy of 16 lorries, escaping with an estimated 31,600 kilos of explosives. Simultaneous actions took place in Tolima, Bolivar and
1982, the UC-ELN had 230 fighters, divided between three rural fronts and five urban struc-
FARC. The UC-ELN has a position of trying to provide alternatives to coca production for the peasants, and criticises what it claims is the FARC attitude of "drugs only kill rich imperialists" complacency in the face of drug abuse in the first
UC-ELN policy is to impose its own taxes on the multinationals that operate in the areas it controls Shell and Oxy have pulled out of the Tenal and Bajo Caranal regions. The other large companies present in the region are, presumably, paying. The strategy, which seems to be paying off, is to maximise the politico-military pressure on the government, while assuring the movement a larger income than it could hope to win from "traditional" activities. * * The author is a leading member of the Socialist Workers Party (PST), Uruguayan section of the Fourth International. He contributes regularly to the party's bimonthly Correspondencia. Sources for this article: Semana (Colombia), Pagina 12 (Argentina), Brecha (Uruguay).
February 1997#285 7
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