Biggest challenge yet for "civil" Zaptatistas
The year of change
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* Mexico In November, Mexico's ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party rejected reforms of the country's notoriously corrupt and undemocratic electoral system. But they sweetened the pill with $300 million in state funding for this years parliamentary elections. Once again, complains Braulio Moro, the "loyal opposition" has sacrificed democracy and justice, for a few crumbs of the cake. When Ernesto Zedillo became president in December 1994, many commentators applauded his promises of "definitive electoral reform." Electoral fraud has been a central tactic of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), which has ruled Mexico's virtual one-party state for more than 60 years. Zedillo, it was claimed, represented a new period in which the PRI would accept reform, or, more exactly, transform itself.
On January 16, 1995, all four parties represented in parliament; the PRI plus the right-wing National Action Party (PAN) and the left-wing Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) and the Workers' Party (PT) signed the "Commitments to a National Political Agreement" - a document that sought to establish suitable conditions for putting Zedillo's reforms into effect.
From the day the document was signed, negotiations in Mexico's top political circles have oscillated between tensions, threats and counter-threats. Shut away in the Interior Ministry meeting rooms, far from the fire raging in Mexican society, the authors of the "Commitments" document slowly constructed their "reform" proposal.
Twelve months later, Zedillo was the "witness of honour" when the electoral reform pact was signed by representatives of all four parliamentary parties in August 1996. With such unanimous support the politicians sat back and waited. All that remained was for Congress to make the necessary modifications to the constitution.
But then the PRI scored disastrous results in the local, state and gubernatorial elections held in 25 of the country's 31 states. The latest round of elections, which took place November 10 in the states of Mexico, Hidalgo and Coahuila, confirmed the ruling party's setbacks. For the first time since the 1917 Mexican revolution, almost half the population is governed, at the municipal or state level, by opposition parties.
The PAN now governs more than 34 million Mexicans, from a total population of 93 million. The PRD runs towns and cities with nine million inhabitants. The PRI now controls only four of the country's largest cities, including the capital, Mexico City
The right-wing PAN made the biggest gains, in elections in which the population expressed its discontent with a corrupt, crisis-ridden regime. This is not cause for opumism.
The PRD's score has improved, mainly as a result of changes in its leadership bodies in early 1996. The new party leadership has focused all efforts on electoral campaigns. With more elections scheduled during 1997, the PRD wants to present itself as a party ready to assume "institutional responsibilities", ', capable of negotiation and, as the PRD president himself says, "willing to seek consensus." 3
More votes were cast for the opposition than the PRI. But the most significant aspect of last year's local elections was the record abstentionism, beating Mexico's traditionally high rate of non-participation. In the State of Mexico, adjacent to the capital, only about 30% of registered voters actually cast ballots. Not that any of the parliamentary parties seemed particularly concerned. Anti-civic legislation
Zedillo's reform, approved by the parlamentary opposition, is an anti-civic law. It is designed only to normalise the relationship between the political forces currently represented in Congress.
It blocks all possibilities of participation for those sectors of "civil society" that do not identify with one or the other of the four parliamentary parties. Key democratic demands, such as the right to present independent or coalition candidacies and allowing referendums and plebiscites on key issues were effectively ignored. From consensus to crisis
Last autumn's disastrous election results were not the only factor that undercut the euphoria which took hold of the political elite after the opposition signed the reform pact in
On November 14, Congress passed a new law on state financing of political parties. Not surprisingly, the ruling PRI claimed the lion's share of the $300 million allocated for the eight month electoral campaign. A monstrous sum, given the seriousness of the economic crisis, and the conditions of absolute misery in which more than 40 million Mexicans live.
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Government financing of political parties, first introduced in the 1970s, plays two roles. First, it maintains the Mexican state in the role of King Midas. Except that instead of turning everything it touches into gold, the PRI state-party uses its gold to corrupt and rot all potentially independent organisations, and the individuals who lead them. All the major parties, without exception, have taken government money, and find themselves implicated in the vicious circle of corruption that props up the state. Allocating $300 million for the 1997 elections is a confirmation of the general strategy. The PRI, and the others, are setting out on an obscene "campaign" of buying votes, prevarication and false promises.
In this context, the PRI machine in the federal congress found itself at loggerheads with all three opposition parties on the day Zedillo's "definitive electoral reform" was submitted to a vote. Aware of the difficulties ahead, PRI deputies rejected almost everything in the new law that could have made Mexico's elections just a little bit fair, and a little bit democratic. They were particularly ruthless in eliminating any liberalisation of the regulations discouraging coalitions, and all new penal measures against electoral
And so concluded the great electoral reform. The institutional consensus so carefully nurtured by the political elite ended in a moment of pure deception.
Of course, to the extent that all this was a deal decided at the highest political circles, the rest of society was not very surprised. No-one expects the opposition to call on the population to rise up in defence of its civic rights. For the right-wing PAN and the leftwing PRD, the population is an electoral force, but not a political one. Neither has the slightest desire to mobilise society as part of an effort for a fairer electoral system.
While PRI deputies rejected amendment after amendment to the electoral reform bill, PAN and PRD legislators assured the media that the ruling party was acting "against the will of the President". The next day, Zedillo clarified the issue for them. "Yesterday's reform was definitive No further reform proposals will be presented to congress during my term of office." S The 1997 elections
Local elections will be held later this year in 11 states, and Mexico City. National elections will also be held for the Chamber of Deputies and one quarter of seats in the Senate. Given the depth of the economic and political crisis, these elections will be more important than the presidential elections, slated for the year 2000.
Mexico City will elect its mayor for the first time. Until now, the head of the capital city had been appointed by the president. The city is a bastion of the opposition, but the PRI has always controlled local government, under anti-democratic legislation regulating the capital's status.
Everything suggests the PRI will be the biggest loser of any even half-fair election. It's no surprise that several of the ruling party's more opportunist politicians have already found refuge in one of the other parties, particularly the PRD.
The barriers to forming electoral coalitions that PRI deputies approved in November were aimed at preventing the formation of a PRD-PAN slate in Mexico
Mexico * City. While the PRD has an important presence in the capital, none of the party's leaders is in a strong position as the campaign starts. Given their good results in the 1994 parliamentary election, the PAN is the clear favourite. Though the party will have some talking to do to justify their role as PRI concubine during the rule of the nowdiscredited former president Salinas.
The most probable result is that no party will win an absolute majority in Mexico City or in the country as a whole. Each party will be manoeuvring carefully, with one eye on each of the other parties. Each party will present itself as an essential factor for the "governability" of the country. None of the parties wants to see the situation "get out of hand after the results are announced
The Zapatista rebels have still not made a clear statement defining their approach towards the elections. "The government thinks the political system in this country has a strong enough stomach to digest us without much discomfort, as if we were a political force that didn't merit the slightest concession," says Zapatista leader Subcomandante Marcos. But, rather than "going with the political elite and becoming professional politicians," he promises that the Zapatistas will turn the other way, towards the people, who expect us to make new proposals.
Marcos has realised something very important. Much of civil society is not linked to any of the parties. Its participants remain spectators in the political game plan designed by the PRI and the parliamentary opposition. A significant minority identifies with the Zapatistas' political positions, and would be more than happy to knock down the whole rotten scaffold of the current party system.
The Zapatista project for the 1997 elections is difficult, and risky. But the same could be said about their three-year public existence, ever since they burst onto the scene on the day the North American Free Trade Agreement took effect.
The trajectory, and the statements of the EZLN make it impossible for them to enter into the back-room games so popular in Mexican political circles.
In 1994, the Zapatistas indirectly called for a vote for some PRD candidates. They are unlikely to follow the same strategy in 1997. But so far, Marcos has not made a concrete proposal. But in the coming weeks the Zapatistas may launch a fresh initiative, in the hope of enabling the unrepresented majority of civil society to make a radical break with the "old regime." Notes 1) The largest state, surrounding Mexico City. The 1995 census records 11.7 million inhabitants • 13% of the total population. The State of Mexico produces more than 12% of Mexico's GDP. 2) Manuel Lopez Obrador replaced Porfirio Munoz Ledo as PRD president. 3) Proceso #1043, 27 October 1996. 4) Expression used by Porfirio Munoz Ledo, former PRD president. 5) Reforma, 16 November 1996. 6) La Jornada, 26 November 1996.
February 1997 #285 9
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Raul Pont is a leading member of Socialist Democracy, the current within Brazil's Workers Party (PT) identified with the Fourth International. In October 1996 he was elected Mayor of the southern city Porto Alegre. International Viewpoint: You are the third consecutive PT Mayor' of Porto Alegre. That's quite a record Raul Pont: We have made two main promises to the population. Firstly, to increase popular participation, strengthen the participative budget process, and consolidate the municipality's "democratic space". To do this, respect for the decisions made by these popular organs is fundamentally important. When we took office on January 1st, our budget had already been fixed by the community, during the previous year. We will respect this budget rigorously.
Our second commitment is to do, during our mandate, the things we promised during the election campaign. We said that Porto Alegre should become the practical opposition to the neo-liberal hegemony in this country. We said that it was perfectly possible to run a large city under a balanced budget, without new debts or job cuts, with the town hall playing an active role, in co-operation with the state. This means taking measures which range from fighting unemployment to defending public sector enterprises. Like the telecommunications utility CRT, which state governor Britto, an ally of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, wants to privatise. • Your victory must have helped the party in the rest of the state.
The example of Porto Alegre is increasingly important in the rest of Rio Grande do Sul state, where the PT had excellent results in these last elections. We now control 25 town halls, and in 18 others a PT vicemayor works in coalition with the PDT and PSB. Coalitions in which opposition to President Cardoso is a central element. We
Brazil have consolidated the PT and the Popular
Front as the pole of opposition to Governor Britto and President Cardoso. This will prove important as we approach the 1998 elections for state governors and a new president.