Nicaraguan revolution under attack
With the escalation of imperialist attacks on Nicaragua, the political and military situation in Central America is polarizing rapidly.
In the last fortnight, Under Secretary of State Enders warned Nicaragua that something drastic could happen if it brought heavy Soviet equipment or troops
Revelations by the Washington Post in the same period made it quite clear what ism wants to see the legitimacy of the region, have shifted their policy someonto the isthmus.
The Washington Post reported that nearly a year and a half ago, after a National Security Council meeting on November 16, 1981, Reagan ordered the drawing up of "contingency plans to deal with unacceptable military actions by Cuba."
This title, in fact, was a fig leaf for preparations for U.S. intervention against the liberation struggles in Central America, as the documents obtained by the U.S. daily made clear.
Far from viewing Soviet or Cuban military involvement as the fundamental danger, a paper prepared for a National Security Council discussion in April 1982 saw it as offering some advantages.
'Introduction of MIGs into Nicaragua could be exploited to obtain financing for upgrading of Honduran Air Force and stationing U.S. squadron in Honduras."
The greatest worry the paper expressed, according to the Washington Post, was that congress would not back Reagan's policy in El Salvador and would order an
In fact, the growing crisis of the Salvadoran military is more and more notorious.
On April 18, the Salvadoran minister of defense, General Jose Gillermo Garcia, announced his resignation. He was replaced by General Carlos Eugenio Vides Casanova, director of the National Guard, which is believed responsible for the massive campaign of murder and torture against civilians.
The following article deals with the effects in Nicaragua of the increasing polarization in Central America, including the escalation of the counterrevolutionary As of now, Ronald Reagan is engaged in a semi-open aggression against Nicaragua. There is a wealth of eye-witness testimony to the role of U.S. advisors in organizing the military operations carried achieve their objective of restructuring the dictatorship and improving the international image of the Salvadoran regime if they coincide with a clear shift of the military situation in favor of the dictatorship's armed forces.
It is in this context largely that the United States needs to internationalize and undermined. Those engaged in this imperialist destabilization campaign clearly are capable of anything, and, logically, the U.S. is surrounding itself with the most hard-headed opponents of the Sandinista revolution, the former Somocista National Guard.
For this reason, the military incursions of the past weeks, the statements of the counterrevolutionary command of the Nicaraguan Democratic Front (FDN) that it has established bases in three of the country's fourteen provinces, and the rumors that a provisional government is going to be declared cannot be taken
If these objectives are achieved, they would give the imperialists new to play and concrete chips for large-scale bargaining in the region. In fact, U.S. imexclude the possibility of "negotiations," if the relationship of military forces were more fav-
In this sense, it can be said that U.S. imperialism is still seeking to create the conditions for an overall political discussion regarding the region, the need for which was cited by Mexican President Lopez Portillo on February 21, 1982, in his Managua Appeal.
At that time, Lopez Portillo proposed more its intervention in the region. By an overall peace plan designed to solve
Guards, who are based just across the striking at Nicaragua, it is trying to cut "by separate but converging channels"
Honduran frontier.
off the source of military aid to the three kinds of conflict - the one involv-
The recent revelation of plans to build a U.S. radar station in Honduras capable of monitoring air traffic throughout the region has added a new and important piece to the picture of U.S. intervention in Central America.
The Reagan administration seems to be in a hurry. In Salvador, the relative success that Washington achieved in carrying off the March 1982 elections was largely neutralized by the weight of the extreme right in the Assembly that was
The divisions in the government and in the army have deepened.
ship's crisis of bourgeois leadership thus remains as acute as ever. The U.S. more and more fears that it may see a break-up of the Salvadoran army and regime similar to what happened to the Somocista
National Guard in 1979.
Thus, the presidential elections scheduled for the end of the year can only
FMLN in El Salvador and isolate the
However, while U.S. imperialism is trying to create the best possible conditions for inflicting a serious setback on the FMLN forces before the late 1983 elections, it is also seeking to deal blows to the Nicaraguan revolution.
### IMPERIALIST
MILITARY ESCALATION
By putting military pressure on the Nicaraguans through its Somocista allies, the U.S. wants to force the Sandinistas to devote considerable resources to military spending and thereby to block the rebuilding of the country's economy.
While it cannot immediately undertake actions designed to overthrow the Sandinista government outright, ing Nicaragua, the one involving El Salof relations between the U.S. and Cuba.
such a position create some diplomatic problems for the U.S. military initiative in Central America. But at the same time, it is designed to put such governments as the Mexican, the Spanish, and even the French in a position where they could serve as mediators in negotiations.
Nonetheless, right now, the sort of positions taken by Lopez Portillo help to isolate the American policy of aggression on the diplomatic level. This process has taken shape more clearly since the spring
Sandinista Nicaragua has been elected to the UN Security Council. such as Venezuela or Colombia, were among the U.S.'s best allies in the
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FSLN UNA VIA Managua government seriously challenged
At a summit meeting held on the Panamanian island of Contadora in January, Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela, and Panama adopted a joint statement calling for separating the Central American conflicts from the U.S.-Soviet confronand for solving them through negotiation.
During the Security Council debate on the invasion of Nicaragua by Somocista commandos, allies of the U.S. such as the Netherlands, Pakistan, and Spain went so far as to question the American version
Honduras and El Salvador, which are not members of the Security Council, gave total support to the U.S. policy.
Larger and larger sections of the American people are opposing the slide of Reagan's policy toward direct intervention in Central America.
legal political formations outside the Sandinista Front, there is a real pluralism in the labor movement, and papers redifferent points of the elements representing the bourgeoisie have been continually breaking off from the government. the spring of 1980, Alfonso Robelo and Violetta Chamorro left the cabinet set up at the time of Somoza's overthrow. This was in protest against the fact that the Sandinista current got majority in the Council of State.
Arturo Cruz, and others who took Robelo and Chamorro's place cabinet, resigned in their turn in protest against their lack of any real power. After being named ambassador to the U.S., Cruz defected once and for all.
After renegotiating the country's fortrol by the Sandinista government. While it is true that the private sector still predominates strongly both in industry and agriculture, it is more and more hemmed in by the government's almost total control over credit and foreign trade.
Moreover, while the state sector embraces only 20% to 30% of agriculture, it is closely linked to a constantly expanding cooperative sector. Big private nonetheless, continues to play a key role in the production of cotton, which is a key crop. In industry, successive expropriations have expanded the public sector until it accounts for production. bourgeoisie has lost the bulk of economic
At each test of strength with sectors of the bourgeoisie, the Sandinista leadership has acted in the same way. It has
Within
American bourgeoisie itself and in congress, voices are being raised against the dangers of region-wide war and the present political and military orientation of sor as ambassador to Washington, broke in the spring of 1982, it released them in with the Sandinista regime. His pretext order to participate in negotiations. But the Reagan administration.
The line of the Reagan administration even made some allies of U.S. imhas perialism edgy.
In this regard,
Alvaro
Jerez, spokesman of the Revolutionary
Democratic Alliance (ARDE), the antimade up of
Sandinista organization elements of the old anti-Somocista bourgeoisie who have withdrawn to Costa
Rica, declared recently "if the Reagan administration wants to democratize Nicareign debt, the chairman of the central bank, Alfredo Cesar, went into exile in
In December, Cruz's succesblown hot and cold. For example, in the fall of 1981, it jailed the top leaders of the employers organization, COSEP. And agua and bring peace to the region, it is FS LN, Vanguardia del pueblo not going about it in the right way."
This grouping is afraid that the military operations cooked up by Washington will only lead in the long run to reinforcing the legitimacy of the revolutionary Sandinista regime within the country and internationally by exposing the direct role of imperialism and Somocista diehards in the aggression against Nicaragua.
THE COURSE OF THE SANDINISTA REVOLUTION
These imperialist maneuvers in fact involve the risk for the U.S. of touching off a new anti-imperialist radicalization in Nicaragua, of making irreversible the already profound break that exists bewhat remains of the local bourgeoisie. economy" could be broken once and for all by new sanctions against private sectors suspected of collaborating with the
Up until now, the Sandinista leaders have always declared their respect for pluralism and their ment to what they themselves call system of "mixed economy." the overthrow of Somoza, a conflict has raged between the bourgeoisie allies and the revolutionary government. And the outcome of this is that the relationship of forces has shifted more and more in favour of the Sandinistas.
To be sure, political pluralism is still respected, inasmuch as there are several was that an interview in which he came out for lifting the state of emergency decreed in September 1981 and for free
Finally, Eden Pastora, deputy minister of the Sandinista army, and considered close to the Socialist International, went into opposition in the spring of 1982. Together with Alfonso Robelo, he founded the Democratic Revolutionary Alli-
Today, it is the church hierarchy led by the archbishop of Managua, Miguel Obando y Bravo, that is trying to fill the vacuum left by the flight of the main representatives of the bourgeoisie. functioning as the focus for opposition to the Sandinista revolution within the
But in so doing, it is running the risk of setting in motion a process of social and political differentiation among the faithful, as was shown by the pope's
As for the "mixed economy," it has evolved toward greater and greater conthe confrontations and periods of tension have always led to the same result - a compromise on the economic level but a strengthening of the political authority of the FSLN and of its dominant role in the
The Sandinista leaders have, moreover, been very clear on this point. At the time of the conflict with Alfonso Robelo and Violetta Chamorro in March 1980, they declared frankly that elections would not be held until after the revolution was
By naming the replacements itself for Robelo and Chamorro, the leadership of the Sandinista front clearly indicated that it had a greater authority than the government.
Following the Pastora, the national leadership of the FLN again issued a statement that left no room for misunderstanding:
"We pledge not to change our anthem, to continue to stand side by side with the peoples struggling against oppression, to continue to exercise our right to sover-
Sandinista militia at the time of the insurrection in Managua (DR)
eignty, to arm to defend ourselves, not to the confiscated property, not to give back to the big landowners the lands that our peasants have regained and which they are working today, not to extend an amnesty to counterrevolutionaries and their accomplices, never to return the banks to their former owners, to continue with our plans for education, public health, and housing for the working
We pledge that this Sandinista people's revolution, this revolution of the workers and the poor, will never be betrayed. Those who are threatening us and attacking us shall not pass."
This statement also affirmed the determination of the Sandinista leadership to advance toward "building a society without exploited or exploiter."
Two weeks later, in his May 1 speech, Tomas Borge took up the same theme: "Some workers think that the main enemy of the working class is bourgeoisie. class has been mortally wounded in this
And the dying are never the worst enemy. The worst enemy of the working class is division in its own ranks.... Our people, the working people, know in what direction we are going. So I ask you workers and peasants assembled here today: Where are we going? Toward soc-
The constant necessity to assure the self-defense of the revolution against imperialism is putting a terrible pressure on the country's economy. It is imposing new sacrifices on the workers and peasants, who suffered during the civil war be-
But at the same time, it is deepening the revolution.
TOWARD A RADICALIZATION
In fact, the struggle against the coun terrevolutionary operations underway on the Honduran border or on the Costa Rican one is draining off a large part of the financial resources freed by the state
The Sandinistas are obliged to maintain an army of nearly 40,000 people and take on the cost of mobilizing the militia. And this is to say nothing of the loss resulting from the diversion of part of the labor force from production to tasks of defense. According to official figures, in 1982 the milita took part in seventy military engagements.
As for the bourgeoisie, or what remains of it, it is following a policy of sab-
The World Bank itself estimates that private investment, which representunder Somoza, amounted to no more than 10% at the beginning of 1982.
Illiteracy has receded spectacularly. The same goes for infant mortality. public health system assures free medical and dental care to those who need it. Overall food consumption has increased by 40% by comparison with the Somoza
However, the distribution system is A 1982 study in Managua showed no significant improvement in the diet of the poor. drought did grave damage to the crops.
The fall in prices of certain raw materials dealt another blow to the economy. Father Xavier Gorostiaga, director of the Economic Institute of Nicaragua, recently told an American journalist: "The problem comes not so much from the volume of production as from its
Two years ago, sugar sold at 24 cents a pound. It is now at 9 cents. We may have lost 140 million dollars in 1982 simply because of the deterioration in the terms of trade. This reduced the total income from imports and held back the process of reforms."
Another factor is the foreign debt, which exceeds 2.5 billion dollars, and is continuing to mount. Already in 1981, service on this debt absorbed 28% of ex-
Moreover, because of the port revenue. agreement on rescheduling the debt, the creditors will be presenting the big bills in 1985.
In order to try to get the firmest possible grip on the throat of the revolution, the U.S. is considering reducing the Nicaraguan sugar import quota at the same time that it is stepping up its military pressure on the country. This is what the National Security Council is demanding, on the pretext that Nicaragua's quota reports 2.1% of total sugar imports, whereas the quota for the U.S.'s "loyal ally," Honduras, amounts to only 1%.
A representative of the Nicaraguan embassy in the U.S. immediately made a statement saying that the threatened reduction of the quota would mean an economic attack aimed "at killing the Nicaraguan revolution." The cut would result in an annual loss of about 12 million dollars to the Nicaraguan economy.
The Sandinista regime has inherited an archaic industrial structure not adapted to meeting social needs. In 1982, according to the official figures, industrial production dropped by 5.6%. This is after a drop of 26% in 1979, a rise of 13% in 1980 and a further increase of 2.8% in 1981. But behind this overall decline, there is a difference between the public sector, where production has increased by 4.1%, and the private sector representing two-thirds of industrial production, where there has been a drop of 11.7%.
This situation cannot go on for ever. The military tests of strength may precipitate the final resolution. In January, wholesale trade in such essential products as cooking oil, flour, and soap, was nationalized. In January also, an extraordinary mobilization of 100,000 workers made it possible to save the coffee crop, which had ripened prematurally. A record harvest of 140,000 quintals (1 quintal equals 100 pounds) was brought in.
5
In February, a housing law was drawn up with the help of the Sandinista Defense Committees (CDS). This legislation provides for giving title to 67,000 dwellings to the tenants living in them. It does not offer compensation to the owners except in exceptional cases (for example, if they themselves live in the dwellings they
Moreover, while the military aggression against Nicaragua might demoralize sections of the population that are not particularly militant, its overall effect has been the contrary. flex to defend the revolution and its gains.
An American reporter has attested to this, writing: "The war and austerity measures have not provoked very much discontent here. In fact, the war seems to be stimulating national unity. Nicaraguans understand dinista leaders are doing a good deal better than they did a year ago....A lot of them seem to think now that it is American intervention that is making things worse in their country. shortage of products relatively less difficult to endure." (1) THE BOURGEOIS OPPOSITION AND
THE DEBATE ON PARTIES
Among the Nicaraguan opposition, the unleashing of the military escalation is polarizing things to
The former Somocista National Guards, who in the last analysis are simply the agents of imperialism, are set-
They are pushing the entire opposition into confrontation. When a conflict becomes armed, people inevitably have to choose their camp.
It is the FDN, the main armed opposition group, however, that is responsible for the invasion of Nicaragua in March from across the Honduran border. made up almost exclusively of former Somocista National Guards based in Honduras and led by Colonel Enrique Ber-
Nicaraguan Democratic UnionFARN), led by Fernando Chamorro Rappacciolli and based in San Jose, Costa Rica, is now reportedly coordinating its actions with the FDN. It claims to have infiltrated about 600 guerrillas into the country over the last eight months. (2)
The UDN-FARN is supposed, moreover, to have broken with the Democratic Revolutionary Alliance (ARDE) of Alfonso Robelo and Eden Pastora because these figures refused to accept collaboration with the Somocista forces that they were fighting only a few months
While Eden Pastora announced with considerable fanfare in March that he was getting ready to open up a new military front against the Sandinista regime in the south, Robelo declared that the ARDE would not participate in any joint actions. And he ruled out any invasion in
In fact, the ARDE leaders have preferred to wait in the wings as a reserve card for negotiations rather than compromise themselves irremediably by lining up with Somocistas out to make a
But the room for "third force" politics is clearly very limited.
At the same time that the bourgeois opposition was more and more lining up in the camp of the armed struggle against the Sandinista regime, called by the Council of State was held in January 1983 in Managua to discuss the draft law on political parties.
The Doctor Ramiro Sacasa Democratic Coordinating Committee, which includes the debris of the bourgeois opposition undermined by the departure of Alfonso Robelo, refused to take part in these discussions. It argued that there was a lack of freedom for both oral and written
Instead The Democratic Coordinating Committee sent on a Latin American tour a delegation made up of representatives of COSEP, the Constitutional Liberal Movement (MLC), the Social Democratic Party (PSD), the Nicaraguan Workers Confederation (CNT) and the Confederation for Trade-Union Unity (CUS) to present its positions. One of the main demands of the Democratic Coordinating Committee is for elections to be held in 1984 instead of in 1985, as is scheduled.
On the other hand, the six parties that make up the Revolutionary Front (FPR) did participate in this symposium. They are, besides the FSLN, the two Stalinist factions represented by the Nicaraguan Socialist Party (PSN) and the Nicaraguan Communist Party, as well as the People's Action Movement (MAP) -which has Maoist origins - the Independent Liberal Party (PLI), and the Social Christian People's Party (PPSC).
The main criticism of the law on parties raised by the PSN and the PLI conthe role assigned to the parties, which will remain subordinated to the institutions. The two formations demanded that parties be able to seek political power by winning an electoral majority.
On the other hand, the PCN and the which are not represented in the Council of State, criticized the draft law as being too liberal. The former, which characterizes the Sandinista revolution as "bourgeois democratic," denies any legitimacy to bourgeois parties. Along with this, it demanded the nationalization of the means of communication. The latter called for the suppression of all activity by the parties of the right "because the bourgeoisie must not have any rights..."
The PPSC, which broke with the Soc-
Party because of the role played by the hierachy in the opposition the Sandinista regime, considers the FSLN as the vanguard of the revolutionary process. While agreeing that the purpose of political parties is to gain power, it considers that in the present conditions elections should not "put in question either the objectives or the process of the revolution."
The FSLN, which is far stronger than the other five small formations in the Revolutionary Patriotic Front, wants to continue such consultations with respect to the draft law on political parties and the elections rules that will be instituted.
However, if the first discussions have demonstrated a desire to respect a certain political pluralism, they have also shown the limitations of it in practice. The elections to come are conceived of essentially as a form of consultation. The election result will remain subordinated to the defense of the revolution.
The attacks that are going on increase the weight of this argument, revealing more and more the historic and organic links between the bourgeois opposition and the Somocista attackers backed by U.S. imperialism. In fact, facing the imperialist and counterrevolutionary attack, the only effective answer to the bourgeois agitation for immediate elections is to extend the real powers exercized by such organs of people's power as the CDS and
While it is true that the FSLN's five partners in the discussion on the draft law on political parties are all very small organizations, it is nonetheless important this debate took place and that it did
At a time when the Western press, even its most "enlightened" representatives, is keeping its eyes peeled for the slightest sign of authoritarianism in Nicaragua, the following facts must be noted: The bourgeois parties, even though they openly oppose the regime, have the right to legal existence as long as they do not call for taking up arms against the govern-
Moreover, the presence of left parties independent of the FSLN shows that political discussion is being maintained. These facts alone represent democratic practice in a country that is being besieged militarily and economically by im-
The response to the escalation of imperialist attacks will necessarily involve a new radicalization of the revolutionary process in Nicaragua. The state will be obliged to intervene more in the private sector to deal with sabotage and to maintain the infrastructures necessary for defense. It will have to increasingly push aside internal opponents that are in flagrant collusion with the attackers.
At the same time, the Sandinista leaders will continue to be anxious to preserve the pluralist image of their revolution and not to do anything that could into the hands of the imperialist operation in the region. They are not unaware that in the medium term the future of their revolution is tied to that of the revolution in El Salvador.
The Christian Science Monitor, April 4, 2. The FARN have just announced that they are continuing discussions with the FDN 'in an attempt to achieve unity of action in the struggle." Inforpress Centroamericana. Ciudad
Latin American Weekly Report, March 31,