Political Europe and its institutions
Top officials of the European Union have noticed the rising opposition of the population. Their response is often to argue that "Europe needs to be bigger, rather than smaller," and "We need to complete the economic and monetary Europe with a political Europe." In the name of this "political Europe", , they appeal for a reinforcement of state power. Reviving old memories, they suggestion that this would be the path toward a social Europe. The reality is quite different. The EU is not confronting dark economic forces (financial markets, multinational corporations). It defends them. The "political Europe" that is underway does not mean more, but rather less democracy. The EU does not provide support for a social Europe, but undermines it. A hidden process
Since this is a matter that touches the future of the peoples of Europe and the daily life of millions of men and women, it might have been expected that the stakes would be clearly defined, the proposals discussed publicly, and the "laws" adopted by a democratic procedure (such as universal suffrage). This has not been the case.
The EU is engaged in an ongoing constitutional process. "The construction of Europe is an ongoing process," as Klaus Kinkel, the German foreign minister put it. The institutions adopt norms, and structures evolve and develop, in a pragmatic manner. The three levels of decision-making power in the EU (community-wide, intergovernmental, and national) intertwine, confront each other, and win or lose ground. The EU is a fragile structure riddled with contradictions. This is a process in which prudence and patience are the key words. Each real step forward, usually in a crisis, requires careful evaluation of relationships of forces, guarding the interests of the national states, and to a lesser degree, between capital and labour.
This also requires that the process be closely supervised by a tiny team made up of a few government ministers in each national administrations and a tiny nucleus of countries (the French-German pair with one eye on Britain). This is how the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC, composed of the prime ministers or heads of state) is moving toward a revision of the Constitution of the EU (the Treaty of Maastricht). And beyond!
The very institutional structure of the EU is undemocratic. To believe the official speeches, the EU's institutions make up a harmonious and well-balanced triangle: the Council (cabinet ministers of the member countries) represent the states; the Commission embodies the "community" spirit (the EU as such), and the European Parliament speaks for the citizenry. But in reality, who decides what, and how? An authoritarian structure
In parliamentary democracy, power is vested in the sovereign people. This sovereignty is expressed through election of (parliamentary) representatives under universal suffrage, for a (parliamentary) assembly. This is where the preponderance of power is lodged within the state apparatus. There is a separation of powers into legislative (Parliament), executive (the cabinet and administration), and judicial branches. The Constitution and the Parliament define the rules of each of these institutions (rules for constituting, determining composition, domain, and prerogatives) and their reciprocal ties. To define and amend the Constitution (the fundamental law of a country there is a Constituent Assembly. (The parliament may eventually play this role, according to particular rules.)
In the EU, separation of powers does not exist. Moreover, the administrative branch (the European Council of Ministers) concentrates in its own hands the legislative power, the constitutional power, and part of the judicial power. Thus it is the Council of Ministers that imposes sanctions on a country that deviates from the norms. There is no possibility of appeal. This is particularly true for Ecofin (The Council of Ministers of Economy and Finances) where the convergence criteria for monetary union are concerned. The Council can even go beyond its explicit prerogatives to seize control of the "co-ordination of the general economic policies of the member states." (Article 145). A weak parliament...
Of course, the European Parliament is elected by universal suffrage. But it lacks the elementary prerogative of a parliament: designating and dismissing the cabinet (ie the Council and the Commission); amending, approving, or rejecting the budget; adopting laws in general and in particular those laws that regulate the functions of the executive and judiciary branches, and constitutional amendments. In other words, the European Parliament is not sovereign; it is reduced to a role of consultation and advice
This is a sharp departure from traditional parliamentary democracy. In many ways it resembles the situation before the French and English revolutions of the 17th and 18th ...and "flexible" justice
This authoritarian mode of functioning is made worse by the disturbing role played by the ECCJ (European Community Court of Justice, in Luxembourg), the least visible of the EU's institutions. This flexible and manoeuvrable body has exceedingly far-ranging responsibilities, often with supra-national reach. These responsibilities expand spontaneously to fill the intentional or unintentional gaps in the other structures and institutions of the EU.
The ECCJ has a monopoly on interpreting the Treaties and the entirety of the Community's legal system. It judges the EU's and national states' violations of treaties, reaches verdicts, and imposes penalties. It is the judge of the appeals court. Judges in the member countries are obliged to submit to this court any problem relating to community law; the interpretation of the ECCJ prevails. The ECCJ is explicitly endowed with constitutional power. The treaty
(Art. 4) encourages it to undertake tasks of European unification. As there is a great deal of imprecision in the treaties, and the other institutions regularly find themselves in an impasse, the ECCJ is allowed to substitute itself for them, and break the deadlock! Worsening tendencies
Nothing in the current preparations for the 1997 Amsterdam conference, or after, indicates any change of course. The Parliament by all accounts will remain out of the loop. The EU governments' main wish is to push for more cohesiveness and efficiency. This is tantamount to putting more executive power in the hands of fewer countries. The idea is to remodel the Commission and the Council according to the economic and demographic weight of the member countries (especially with an eye to the expansion of the EU toward the east). This would embarrass the small countries, but still be an insufficient respond to the need for a central
There is an often-confused discussion over whether or not the EU is super-national. No serious plan exists that has the support of the big bourgeoisie. By all appearances, the EU is not destined to become a complete super-national state, comparable to existing national states. It can be defined as a strong, institutionalised inter-state co-ordinating body with the beginnings of a supra-national state apparatus, but whose relative autonomy and current activity are tightly constrained by the (main) member states.
The EU does not rest on a European nation-in-formation. There is no European big bourgeoisie of any homogeneity whatsoever to sustain it. And its current policy unhesitatingly attacks in a harsh way the standard of living of the popular masses (as do those of the national governments that make up the Union). The EU does not act as a transmission belt for democratic, political, and social demands. It has proven incapable of solving the great problems of the day. As a result, its national and social legitimacy is extremely limited.
It is impossible for such a state apparatus to become a tool for a socialist transformation of society. Neither is it possible to impose on it the great social and democratic reforms which occur at the national level.
To create a social Europe and to reverse the current trends, it will be necessary to mount large mobilisations in many countries. The realistic objective of this movement should be to dismantle the EU - its Constitution, its "laws" and its institutions. In order to open the way for a different policy and different institutions. *
Into a new and better century!
executive nucleus (in effect a directorate) and a single spokesperson for foreign affairs. The rule of unanimity would be replaced here and
The International Institute for Research and Education in Amsterdam is a research and there by that of a particular kind of majority.
training centre that is meeting the challenges of the neo-liberal world order by renewing and
What is being presented as a great demo-
- re-founding an alternative perspective. Fields under study at the IIRE include economic cratic step forward, that is, the founding of an globalisation, 20th-century history, ecology, feminism, ethnicity, racism and radical
"economic government" to counterbalance the omnipotence of the European Central
The results of our work are made available to a larger public mainly through our publication
Bank, means a new bolstering of executive power. To fill in the "social deficit." the
"social protocol" (of the Maastricht Treaty)
would be inserted into the new European treaty. But its contents will be far less than the social rights that exist at the level of the national states, butt which are not carried over to the "community" level. This will also be true for the national systems of bilateral or trilateral co-ordination (unions and employers, or unions, employers, and government). In spite of their slide towards co- management, these structures do permit a degree of information access, control, intervention for the labour movement.
The EU is designed to exempt the
"European institutions" from the democratic and social pressure of the populations, and to prevent or at least slow down the extension of rights won and the impact of national
"civil society" to the "Community" level.
The forced march toward monetary union worsens the democratic and social "deficit".
Reform the Treaty or dismantle it?
The EU is based fundamentally on the principle of intergovernmentalism, or interstatism. All major decisions are made, and all institutions (except the Parliament) designated by the member-states. This is true even for the Commission, which has only limited autonomy, and consults on a daily basis with accredited representatives of the national governments. The Monetary Union (convergence criteria, Stability Pact, and European
Central Bank) represents an important step toward the establishment of a beginning of a very antidemocratic and anti-social supernational power. It would remove monetary policy from the province of national governments, and with it whole layers of budgetary, economic, fiscal, and social policy.
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