ETA: a view from the left
* Spain It is time to abandon the armed struggle in the Basque country, argue former ETA member José Iriarte "Bikila," and losu Perales of the revolutionary Marxist group Zutik
The kidnapping and assassination of Miguel Angel Blanco, a conservative councillor from the small town of Ermua, sparked massive protest demonstrations against the Basque separatist group ETA. The crowds included an unprecedented mix of supporters and opponents of the death penalty, those in favour and against the Basque struggle, proven democrats and revamped Francoists, and a whole range of good and bad passions.
Moved by weariness with and a desire to put an end to violence, this "civic rebellion" was boosted by the pro-Spanish media. The movement is now being won to the government's authoritarian policies.
Spain's ruling Popular Party, under cover of its own biased interpretation of the popular anti-ETA mobilisation, taking dangerous authoritarian initiatives. Refusing dialogue and negotiation, it is striving to convert ETA into a strictly
The main responsibility for what is occurring in Euskadi (the Basque country, which straddles northern Spain and SouthWest France) is held by the political forces that negotiated a less than democratic transition from the Franco dictatorship.
Spanish political forces and society as a whole have still not accepted not only the fact that different nationalities exist within the Spanish state, but also the elementary idea that each nation's sovereignty resides in its own people. The 8 International Viewpoint #294
Spanish constitution does not resolve the national question, and is an affront to Basque national sentiments. "Spain, one and indivisible," buttressed by the army, will always been a source of conflict.
Like it or not, ETA is a political and phenomenon. considered as such if we wish to find a solution to the conflict that feeds its growth. The solution requires political negotiations that would free prisoners, allow the return of exiles and change the juridical-political framework, be defined in the negotiation process The evolution of the conflict
The transition from the Franco dictatorship to "democracy" resulted in tremendous frustration for important sectors of the Basque population. But whereas the Spanish left fell into disillusionment and apathy, the Basque
A large part of Basque society continued to "suffer" an identity crisis vis-a-vis the state. Euskadi also suffered a severe economic crisis, which led to rising social radicalisation and street mobilisations. And the wider population continued to have a strong anti-repression conscious-
Given these factors, ETA acquired considerable strength and legitimacy, which went far beyond its military capacity, or the weight in society of its political counterpart Herri Batasuna. What counted was ETA's capacity to destabilise the situation, and its ability to tip the balance in specific struggles. ETA became a reference point within and outside Euskadi, even though many militants did not share all its forms of struggle, and even criticised its more problematic aspects. At the root of this legitimacy was ETA's status as a repository of all the anger and broad disapproval of the political reform that resulted from the pact with Francoism.
Despite the perseverance of specific conflicts, these contradictions are now
Despite our best efforts, the institutions of Euskadi and the Spanish state is achieving consensus approval in important sectors of the population. The conviction that the rule of law, however imperfect, has tacilitated the peacetul expression of national demands has gained ground, at the expense of support for a radical break with the status quo, and tolerance of the use of violence.
The conflicts in Eastern Europe, especially the war in former Yugoslavia, has had a negative effect, almost contagious in past years, on the articulation of national demands against the central government. The state is considered in a more benevolent light, while nationalism is viewed through hypercritical eyes. This has forced moderate nationalists to distance themselves much more from the use of
There is also much greater awareness that traditional formulas for resolving national oppression (self-determination, federation, independence) are more complicated than initially anticipated. And an awareness that due to the ethnic plurality and heterogeneity of the Basque population, there is no unanimity within the national community concerning the right
In addition, the emergence of the Ajuria-enea civic pact [an agreement by the "democratic" parties to marginalise Herri Batasuna, the political wing of the independence movement] reflects a new social division within Basque society. A certain conflict between Euskadi and the central Spanish government is today articulated by all the Basque political parties, including the bourgeois-nationalist Basque National Party (PNV), which controls the regional government. But within the Basque country, there is increasingly "supporters of violence" and "democrats" as some put it, or between "consistent patriots" and the "conglomerate of traitors and pro-Spanish" as others put it.
This coincides with people's weariness with a conflict with no end in sight, a rising death toll, and which generates a climate of confrontation and suffering. Instead of such sentiments being directed against the obstinacy and hard-line approach of the central government, which is truly responsible for what has occurred, the frustration and anger is directed against ETA, which is increasingly viewed as the aggressor.
ETA has reacted in a similar vein, drawing inward, and considering all those aligned with the other side as equally responsible.
Another factor influencing the situation is the different historical period Movements for social change headed by armed vanguards have been diminishing world-wide. Mexico's EZLN is a new and honourable exceptions. But that group has a conception of armed struggle as an exceptional tactic, subordinated to political strategy. It has little in common with ETA.
In most countries, armed struggle, in the best of cases, is seen as a product of the past to be overcome through negotiations, more than the wave of the future or a strategy for emancipation.
With the weakening of revolutionary expectations and organisations, the context
is clearly unfavourable to a form of struggle that increasingly appears out of focus in relation to its costs and possibilities of success. Particularly because, consciously or unconsciously, ETA is pushed toward actions opposed to those basic humanist conceptions that should be preserved even in armed struggle. Methods which the group previously avoided if possible. The evolution of ETA
In its long history ETA has employed different strategies, always closely related to its political evolution. Under Franco, their initial strategy, inspired in the Vietnamese and Algerian experiences of "people's war," gave way to a perspective of action-repression-action. The theory was that every armed action would provoke a reaction on the part of the state, in the form of blind and generalised repression. This, it was thought, would spark the population to rebellion, and justify a greater armed action by the movement. As long as the Franco dictatorship was in power, this theory corresponded somewhat to reality. ETA's prestige grew as the regime weakened.
The 1975 transition to "democracy" stopped this dynamic. ETA recognised the limits of its political and capacities, and decided to seek a negotiated settlement (corresponding, it was argued, to the new bourgeois-democratic stage). In practice, if not in words, the group accepted that the original project of defeating the enemy was no longer
ETA's new strategy was to continue launching attacks, until the political situation became so unbearable that the Spanish state would be forced to negotiate [with Herri Batasuna and the social movements it leads.]
The political situation in Euskadi remained unstable. Herri Batasuna grew and developed. The strategy continued to have elements of credibility, although it already showed many weak points. The Algiers talks
By 1987 the social climate had stabilised considerably. Felipe Gonzalez's Socialist Workers Party (PSOE) was governing Spain without major problems, thanks to an economic boom. But Spain's integration into the European union (a top priority for successive governments) seemed threatened by ETA's persistent activity, and Herri Batsman's success in the Spanish elections for the European parliament. [They won over 40,000 votes accross Spain, with the support of much of
Unsuccessful talks between the government and ETA took place in the Algerian capital Algiers. For the first time, both sides made a serious attempt to reach an initial agreement that would open the door to a negotiated settlement. The reasons for breaking off the talks are unclear. Though the fault probably lies with hard line elements within the PSOE, pressured by the state apparatus. But it also seems that the top ETA leadership, unaccustomed to dealing with this type of problem, broke off the talks on a matter of principle.
The failure of the Algiers talks marked the end of a period. The end of ETA's particular conception of negotiations, and the end of the only serious attempt at a negotiated settlement by a Spanish government.
After Algiers, ETA began to concentrate almost exclusively on its military activities. Without being concerned about the effect this would have on its allies and sympathisers elsewhere in the Spanish state - particularly in Catalonia. This support network for the Basque independence movement contracted severely as a new wave of armed actions hardened public opinion. ETA adopted new and more conflictive tactics, such as car bomb attacks aimed at police and security forces, but with side-effects for the civilian popula-
The undeclared objective of the group was to generate a mood of weariness in the Spanish population, leading to support for negotiations. The 1987 bombing of the Hipercor supermarket in Catalonia symbolises the most heartless side of this tactic. The effect on the solidarity movement was
This campaign was supposed to culminate in 1992, the year of the Barcelona Olympics. But it was cut short by a police swoop which arrested part of the top ETA leadership in Bidart, France. With this move, the Spanish government destabilised ETA's core leadership, to the point where the group no longer hoped to achieve any results in the short term.
ETA's "militarist" negotiating strategy, and widespread disappointment at the breakdown of negotiations, contributed to the emergence of Euskadi's first (antiETA) pacifist organisations.
Most of the Basque parliamentary parties resolved to generate a civic front in opposition to ETA. This Ajuria-Enea Pact was more nuanced than the purely repressive policies of the central government. It mentioned the combination of political and police measures, using dialogue as a valid element for conciliation. But, in practice, it strengthened the anti-ETA dynamic.
Previous agreements of this type had been met with popular indifference. This time, the institutional agreement managed to connect with an emerging movement
Spain * committed to confront ETA and the Basque national liberation movement in the streets.
The creation of a special police force for the Basque autonomous region (which covers most but not all of the Spanish Basque country further complicated the relationship between supporters and opponents of the independence movement. The red berets and ski-masks of the Ertzantza are a symbol of the contradictory role of the Autonomous Government, led by the bourgeois nationalist Basque National Party (PNV). On the one hand, the PNV is increasingly commitment to protecting the stability of the Spanish state. But at the same time, it needs to exert its own power and authority against the Spanish government, and demonstrate the importance of the Autonomy Statute which has placed it in power locally.
The Ertzantza became the subject of a jurisdictional conflict with the central state, obviously reluctant to surrender control of police and "anti-terrorist" functions to a government led even by 'constitutional' Basque nationalists. This conflict was resolved, and the Ertzantza deployed throughout the autonomous territory.
This new Basque police force entered into a calculated and progressively greater confrontation with ETA and the national liberation movement The autonomous police became intensely hostile toward any type of demonstration of support of ETA and the national liberation movement. This aggressiveness soon became mutual. Militants of the national liberation movement identified the Ertzantza not as an expression of Basque sovereignty, but as one more police force at the service of law and order as defined by the state, that is, as a pure and heavy handed army of the Spanish occupation forces.
The problem for ETA was that it now faced the combined action of the central state government, and the Basque autonomous government, led by Basque bourgeois nationalists. The strategy of tension
With ETA militarily weak, after the blows suffered in the early 1990s, Herri Batasuna tried to adapt to the new ideological situation created by the tall of the Eastern European regimes. For a short period, the national liberation movement enjoyed a certain internal and external openness.
Then the leadership switched to the opposite tactic. Convinced that the state would not cede an inch, and with anti-ETA pacifist tendencies challenging the national liberation movement's virtual monopoly on street demonstrations, ETA again began to prioritise its military activities. Having partially rebuild its military structures, it extended the range of targets to include political circles, the judicial system and any entity considered to be supporting the state. ETA resumed the style of intervention that had been the object of self-criticism in the 1980s, with
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* Spain car bombs that caused civilian deaths, and bombs in supermarkets.
The national liberation movement adjusted its stance to comply with the role it had to play in the framework of this new tactic.
The new idea was that there is no better defence than an offensive attack. The military sphere passes before any other consideration. In the framework of this 'strategy of tension', there is no room for subtle nuances. Critical positions must be fought as liquidationist. And when they come from abroad or from forces on the fringes of the movement they wind up being assigned to "the other side of the
This line required a more closed attitude, and an increase in ideological dogmatism. It led to outbreaks of intolerance toward other opposition sectors, for the simple reason that they carried the blue ribbons of the pacifist movement, or publicly disagreed with ETA.
ETA saw this as part of a philosophy of "national confrontation." But only a minority of Basque society views the conflict in this way. As a result, EIA and the entire national liberation movement retreated into a nationalism of resistance. Other concerns, and social and cultural demands, were relegated in practice to second place, except in the trade union arena [where Herri Batasuna sympathisers have considerable influence.]
The battle to extend the organisation's social influence and break out of the isolation imposed by the Spanish state and the Ajuria-Enea Pact was abandoned in favour of solidifying their own forces. The top priorities became internal cohesion, firmness and permanent activism. From this standpoint, a negotiating strategy came to be considered as not very urgent, given the relationship of forces. It may even have seemed to be a problematic course of action in comparison with the current military line, seen as more "secure" in the long run.
This political line has a certain continuity with previous trajectories. ETA has always moved from one strategy to another, varying the importance of political action, while conserving its fundamental perspective, the defining role of armed struggle.
But the current line clearly implies an important shift in relation to the strategy adopted at the beginning of the 1980s.
ETA is increasingly a minority current. The existence of some tens of thousands of unconditional supporters does not resolve the problem of its growing isolation. With each passing day, the group is less understood, even by those close to the national liberation movement.
Today in Euskadi, there are no ethnic conflicts, nor an extreme class polarisation, nor other conflicts that in the past put very broad sectors of the population in conflict with the state and economic powers.
In addition, society is increasingly 10 International Viewpoint #294 against the use of violence for political reasons, a situation that undoubtedly 1s related to the manipulation of public opinion, but which is much more closely tied to the new panorama of a lessening of the weight of national factors in Euskadi. But ETA's current dynamic also clashes with values and ideas held by broad sectors of the social left, and with the new social movements, which are favourable to forms of civil disobedience.
We are no longer in a period in which the culture of resistance allowed for armed struggle and weakened the state's response. With a change in the social and cultural panorama, values that feed a given perception of reality also change.
We are in a transitional period, a true cross-roads. The struggle waged by ETA is a echo from previous times. The organisation has not been able to undertake the necessary transtormation. Partially as a result of its own limitations, but also because of the intransigent strategy of the central government authorities who push ETA to stick to its guns.
The protagnonists of other options, which would allow for other solutions, do not want to or cannot disentangle themPromoting negotiations
Our perspective is to enter into direct negotiations to end a situation that has become bogged down, in which no sector of the left benefits in any way. This has nothing to do with extending more or less legitimacy to ETA. Nor does it mean that we believe that the system is so democratic that it deserves political peace.
We are not against violence as an absolute principle. We recognise that there are situations where it is necessary, or at least inevitable.
But we also realise that the really existing tendency of armed struggle is highly negative; it demands an excessive attention from the social and political spheres, and intellectual life. It feeds a armourplated political culture plagued by dogmatism. It contributes to sectarian thinking Politically it has lost the battle for public opinion. And even if it could win its objectives, these would be terribly mortgaged to the means used to obtain them.
We say this because we want end to the suffering of many people: prisoners. exiles, families on each side, and victims of both sides. Armed struggle in the present situation only helps solidify a broad anti-violence front under the political and ideological leadership of the state. And the objectives of the Sstate have never been -and we have no illusions to the contrary- to allow the people of Euskadi the right to freely determine their own destiny.
In fact, as long as the current situation continues, the central authorities, proponents of law-and-order and pro-Spanish options will feel quite comfortable. Even though some of their leaders may be at risk, the political results of the confrontation are in their favour.
It is even possible that ETA, faced with the lack of a better alternative, may feel more or less comfortable in its current position. The organisation is on familiar ground, in control of its immediate milieu. It does not feel itself to be in danger of collapse in the short term, nor does it have to deal with the uncertainty of re-conversion to a new historic period of the struggle.
But the population as a whole is not very well prepared for the strategies of the top chiefs of staff. Sectors of the pro-independence movement are suffering. They feel obliged to close ranks, precisely because of the difficulties facing their increasingly fragmented political project.
We need a new discourse for the Basque struggle against the bourgeois state and neo-liberalism, for the national struggle itself with its emancipatory and internationalist goals, for the fight to preserve the environment, opposition to racism, the war on poverty and exclusion, and the continued efforts to spread the ideas of rebellion and anti-militarism. We must re-learn old lessons and re-adapt to reality.
The renewal of the Basque left is made difficult by an armed struggle tied to ideas, concepts and values born in the period of resistance to the dictatorship. Old customs
We would never say that ending the armed struggle would necessary bring with it a strengthening or refounding of the social movements and the left in general, in terms of ideas and social weight. Who can tell how things will be
But, although we are conscious of the frenzy that a negotiated solution could spark, we are in favour of such a resolution. We see it as necessary, beyond any a priori balance sheet of gains and losses. We also urge a greater commitment on the part of all those who believe in promoting a civic movement for political negotiation between ETA and the government, to spur an authentic debate on what the democratic resolution to the conflict should
Military victories have been Pyrrhic, and incapable of avoiding outbursts of new conflicts. The only road forward for left forces that seek long-term solutions is a negotiation confrontation. *