Negotiations in the shadow of the gallows
Kurdish problem?
What problem?
* Turkey The Turkish state has no right to judge, imprison and execute PKK leader "Apo" Öcalan. Jean Dupont* Of course, there is no doubt that Apo and the PKK are responsible for a series of crimes against the Turkishand Kurdish-people. They have massacred peasants and teachers, and assassinated both their own "dissidents" and members of other Kurdish and Turkish left groups.
Terrorist attacks in urban areas killed Kurdish and Turkish civilians, making many progressive Turks and Kurds extremely hostile to the PKK. All this made sense only within the PKK's warped, Stalinist ideology.
But the Turkish state has a much longer history of torture, murder and assassination. Tens of thousands of Kurdish and Turkish civilians, and political activists have been imprisoned. Thousands of Kurdish villages have been burned. Tens of thousands of Kurdish peasants have been deported. The most elementary democratic rights have been denied to the Kurds--and the Turks. No, the Turkish Republic has no moral or political right to judge the PKK. Decades of state violence
In any case, the Turkish state, the neighbouring states and the imperialists are ultimately responsible for the violent actions of the PKK. The *This is a much-shortened version of the dossier published in our French sister-magazine Inprecor 7/99. Many nuances have inevitably been lost in the process. We will return to this important theme in future issues. [JD] 14 ° International Viewpoint #315 October 1999 violence and excesses of the Kurdish movement are the result of the violence and misery which dominate their experience of this society, this state. The Kurdish people has suffered decades of repression. Many Kurdish militants learned about violence at the hands of the Turkish police and army.
The web of guilt goes much further. Greece, Syria and the USA have cynically exploited the Kurdish question. Washington backs Iraqi Kurds against Saddam Hussein, but a few kilometres
9n0 further north, backs the Turkish state against the Kurds. Turkey has sometimes supported Iraqi Kurds against the Baghdad regime. Iraqi Kurds have sometimes fought alongside the Turkish army, against the PKK. And the Kurdish question has become the central pretext for European Union bullying of Turkey.
Not one of the criminal members of the Turkish special forces, the military police, the army, the death squads, and the fascist gangs (often recruited by the
secret service to do the real dirty work) have been condemned by the Turkish courts. Those who "disappeared" thousands of Kurdish and Turkish militants have gone unpunished. None of the Turkish politicians who organised, supported or tolerated these outrages has been forced to justify their actions.
Öcalan's death sentence is only the beginning of the real negotiations. "l expected this sentence," he said. "It is an attempt to satisfy public opinion. But now the real political process will start. My death sentence does not change the PKK's] basic line. We will continue our search for peace. Our supporters and activists must respond with calm, and develop mature, careful policies...
"Peace is a historic necessity," the PKK leader continued. "There is no simple solution to the Kurdish question."
Ocalan tried to use his trial to negotiate indirectly with the Turkish state and the country's military leaders. His supporters say he offered them a solution to the Kurdish problem rather than indefinite military confrontation.
Some progressive commentators have a more critical view: "the PKK has always tried to open negotiations with the Turkish military," says one leading member of the left regroupemnt party ODP. "He now seems to be suggesting the capitulation of his organisation. But the Kurdish question began before the PKK, and will exist afterwards."
The state is in no hurry to execute the PKK leader. All Turkish death sentences are automatically referred to the High Court, and then to parliament. There are at least 40 cases pending, and it is 15 years since a death penalty was carried out.
Parliament will probably not discuss Öcalan's case until well after Bill Clinton and European heads of state visit the country in November for the summit meeting of the OCSE (Organisation for Cooperation in Security of Europe.
Turkey's right and far right parties, which have a large majority of seats in parliament, are clearly in favour of execution. And there is intense pressure on the (still undecided) Islamic fundamentalists (FP) and the ruling Democratic Left Party (DSP), which is opposed to the death penalty as such.
But it is far from sure that parliament will ratify Öcalan's death sentence. The PKK has offered far-reaching concessions from its original demands, hoping to generate a favourable response from "doves" in the Turkish establishment.
aqsiloo stigms Prospects for peace?
The PKK has announced a ceasefire and is withdrawing its armed troops from Turkish territory. They promise a "permanent end to the armed struggle. In return, the regime is searching for a
"suspend" the death sentence, without provoking a Turkish nationalist backlash. If the European Court of Human Rights adopts Öcalan's case, this may provide an acceptable excuse to commute his sentence to life imprisonment. The Turkish media are already preparing public opinion for
The regime is unsure how to respond to the PKK stand-down. The government is preparing a (largely symbolic) amnesty law, and legislation on regional decentralisation.
Many west-European solidarity activists were surprised and dissoriented by Apo's declaration that the PKK would be satisfied with measures short of federation or autonomy: "the Kurdish problem is essentially about cultural rights," he has repeatedly stressed. Turkish leftists were less surprised...
The hard line lobby in Turkey is certainly very strong. But there is a genuine debate in army, government and bourgois circles about the possibilities of an agreement with the PKK.
Those opposed to any peace settlement include the mafia (who benefit
'no-man's-land' in the Kurdish region), arms smugglers, the pro-regime and semi-feudal Kurdish village militias, the most corrupt sectors of the army and police, and the neighbouring states (who face their own Kurdish questions).
Despite the understandable bitterness of those who have suffered during the long conflict, ordinary Kurdish and Turkish people have no interest in anything except peace. And sections of the industrial and commercial bourgeoisie see peace as an opportunity to win new markets. The army divided...
The army is deeply divided. Some officers want to continue the war, which guarantees them power, influence, and funds. It also ensures that Turkey has the best trained and best equipped army in the region, and "justifies' cross-border raids into Iraq.
But another section of the military recognise that armed confrontation within the country's borders only weakens Turkey's defensive capacity, and wastes resources which could be used to modernise the army, and increase Turkey's regional domination.
Some generals think executing Apo would serve as an example. Others think this would make him a martyr, and suggest that a defeated enemy should be incorporated, rather than crushed completely. ....The PKK compromises
The PKK no longer demand independence, or even autonomy. They have abandoned the armed struggle. They ask only for cultural rights, and offer their services to the Turkish state in the future.
This must be terribly difficult for many PKK militants and sympathisers to accept, after their heavy sacrifices, and years of guerrilla struggle against the Turkish state—which some of them accuse of "genocide" ".*
International Viewpoint #315 October 1999 15