International Viewpoint Archive

The Fourth International’s English-language review, from 1982

Report 2: The Kurds and Turkey: Fundamentalists Lose Votes — to Fascists!

International Viewpoint No. 315, September 1999 · pp 16-17 · 838 words

Middle East

Fundamentalists lose votes to fascists..

* Turkey Turkish voters are deserting the traditional right-wing parties for the Islamic fundamentalists and the extreme right. The mainstream right parties have ruled Turkey for 50 years (except for the three coups d'état). But their share of the vote has declined from 56% in 1987 to 25%in the April 1999 elec-

Voters have switched to the Islamic fundamentalists, (FP—15%) and the extreme right "grey wolves" (Nationalist Action Party, or MHP18%), who doubled their 1995 vote.

If they can replace their discredited leaders and unite on a common programme, the mainstream conservatives could still regain their dominant position in parliament. But if they fail, the bourgeoisie will either have to authorise the Islamic fundamentalists (FP) or the fascists (MHP) to form a government, or encourage another military intervention into Turkish politics.

The fascists and the fundamentalists attract similar voters-urban petty-bourgois layers in rural Anatolia. and shopkeepers, workers and the urban poor in the poorer districts of the larger cities. They profited from the splits in the mainstream parties, corruption scandals, and a general disillusionment with the neo-liberal policies of the previous governments. Different nationalisms 299n1

Both parties are nationalist, conservative and nostalgic about the Ottoman empire. But the FP celebrates the Ottoman caliphate as the centre of the Islamic world, whereas the MHP remembers the empire as a symbol of Turkish power.

The fundamentalists have never really identified with Turkey's republican system, dominated by all-powerful generals who insist on a non-religious state ideology. The "grey 16 International Viewpoint #315 October 1999 ії пО wolves," on the other hand, recognise the republic of Kemal Ataturk as a development which "saved the Turks from drowning" when the Ottoman empire collapsed in 1918.

Internationally, the fundamentalists orient towards the Arab countries and Muslim groups, whereas the MHP reaches out to Turkie speakers in the former Soviet Union. The fundamentalists are anti-Semitic, anti-American and third-worldist. The MHP is pro-American, and in favour of friendship

Both parties are opposed to Kurdish nationalism, but in different ways. The FP wants to unite all Turkish citizens on the basis of a common Muslim identity. Too much Turkish nationalism could alienate Kurdish Muslims and divide the oumma (community of believers). The MHP opposes any "ethnic particularities" which "divide the Turkish nation." The fundamentalists win many votes among Kurds, while the MHP recruits heavily among ethnic Turks of Caucasian, Balkan and central Asian origin, alienated youth in the larger towns, and even among the country's "golden youth", for whom ultra-nationalism is fashionable. The long road to 'modernity"

In 1994 and 1995, the fundamentalists captured much of the social frustration. But voters and the military elite reacted badly to their attempts to introduce "Muslim" measures wherever they controlled town halls. In the April 1999 elections, about 700,000 voters switched from the fundamentalists to the MHP, mainly in central and eastern Anatolia. In the major towns of Western Turkey, the Islamists lost votes towards the social-democratic DSP.

But the more "moderate" and competent fundamentalist mayors have kept their positions. In Istanbul the party won 19% of votes in the parliamentary election, but 28% in elections for the municipal assembly. Former city mayor Tayyip Erdogan leads the "renewal" current in the party, in semiopposition to 70-year old party leader Necmettin Erbakan. The long march of the " wolves"

In the 1960s and 1970s, the MHP was a 'classic' fascist party. Its "grey wolves" militia assassinated thousands of socialists and trade unionists, and organised pogroms against the Alevi (shiite) minority. It successfully infiltrated the police (it still does). After the 1980 coup d'état, party leader "Basbus" Türkes was imprisoned for four years. The party was forbidden, and thousands of militants were arrested and tortured. A few were even

In the 1980s some MHP cadres switched to Tugut Özal's pro-neoliberal ANAP party. The "grey wolves" joined the country's blossoming mafia (over 70% of Europe's drugs pass through Turkey). Some were recruited by the Secret Service and the police, particularly for "dirty work" in the Kurdish regions.

In 1987 the party received only 2.9% of votes. Under its new leader Devlet Bahçeli, the MHP took a "centrist" strategy. They hoped to capture the sympathy of the younger generation, which was depoliticised, and disinterested in the whole "leftistfascist" polarisation of the older generation. This new generation had been educated in the nationalist, conservative, militarist system imposed by the 1980 coup. Domesticated?

To reinforce his "respectable" discourse, Devlet Bahceli told MHP militants to shave their moustaches, dress smartly, brush their teeth twice daily, smile, be polite, and stop eating garlic.

But the MHP is still not a "party like any other". Bahçeli refuses to make any criticism of the party's excesses during the 1970s—presumably because not all his members are happy with his new, "moderate" line.

The MHP has infiltrated many areas of the state apparatus. Unlike the Islamic fundamentalists, it can aspire to a share in power.

The fundamentalists are too Arab' for Turkey's all-powerful generals. The MHP ideology, in contrast, is perfectly compatible with the Army's anticlerical republicanism.

← Report 2: The Kurds and Turkey: Negotiations in the Shadow of the Gallows · Report 2: The Kurds and Turkey: The Turkish Left — An Ambiguous Victory →

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