Khomeni's heirs face the students
### Iran
Iran's students shook the country in July. M. Agah analyses these massive pro-democracy demonstrations, and the prospects for the "Islamic Republic." The history of contemporary Iran is full of similar protests against despotic regimes. The 1979 revolution was germinated, sprung, and was sustained mainly by the universities. Six months after the fall of the Shah, Ayatollah Khomeini was full of praise and endearments for the students. "Iranian students faced deprivation, torture, and hardship during the long years of oppression by the Shah's regime.... they were subjected to all forms of pressure, distress and intimidation because they dared to stand up against dictatorship, despotism, and refused to submit to the forces of evil."
But six month later the Ayatollah understood that he could not manipulate 2 International Viewpoint #316 November 1999 the students for his political purposes. "All the troubles afflicting mankind have their roots in universities," he fulthe universities "centres of corruption" and "licentious reveries." He declared a bloody "Cultural Revolution".
In April 1980, the regime mobilised para-military and mob forces, and moved in to neutralise the challenge posed by the universities-under the pretext of "islamicising" the universities through "Cultural Revolution". By using violence, by physically taking control of the universities, the regime hoped to 'purge the educational sphere of opposition supporters —who constituted a big majority, Both among students and the faculty. The use of para-military forces and gangs of 'clubwielders' also helped the regime create an extremely repressive "law and order" climate across the country.
Iwenty years later, the regime tried to use the same method, but in an entirely different situation. The political and economical character of Iranian society is quite different. The regime faces a very different national and international situation. And today's student protesters come from a new generation, which has grown up since the "Islamic Revolution."
Over the last two decades, the Islamic regime has failed to achieve its goal of cultural brainwashing of the people-despite the complete take over of universities and other educational and cultural centres, introduction of an Islamic ideology for government, harsh rule on all sectors of the Iranian society, and repression resembling Europe's medieval inquisition.
The regime tolerated student dissent, as long as they whispered their demands to one another. But when student demands and demonstrations echoed in the world, the foundations of
the regime were shaken. The regime knows very well that the students' demands for freedom, democracy and social justice are the same as the Iranian people's.
In response, the regime has resorted to violence. The bloody crackdown reflects the unity of the two factions of the regime-hard-nosed fundamentalists, advocates of absolute, despotic rule; and "moderates" who accept reform as the best way to maintain the trembling regime as long as possible. Background
The explosive situation in Iran is the result of two parallel crises: economic collapse, and a crisis of political leadership
After two decades of Islamic rule, and nearly ten years of economical reform under the "moderate" wing of regime under ex-President Rafsanjani, (in co-operation with international finance organisations like the IMF and the World Bank), the Iranian economy is on the verge of total collapse.
For the vast majority of Iranians, the economic misery is worse than any period since the second world war. Unemployment, inequality, crime and corruption have reached unprecedented levels-despite the particularly savage punishments imposed on small criminals and others who break Islamic law.
Corruption has spread through the entire regime like a virus. Many officials have become very rich through controlling the black market (there is a state monopoly of foreign trade). Others have purchased nationalised industries and firms for ridiculously low
Some have used more crude forms of corruption. Several years ago, the Rafighdoost (leader of the passdarans religious militia) was implicated in the transfer of 123bn Rials into a Swiss bank. He is still at the head of one of the country's largest companies.
The Rial has been devalued to less than 1% of its pre-revolution value. Per capita incomes continues to fall as the population increases and national incomes diminishes. Foreign debt is about $US16bn, with another $11bn still owed for foreign purchases made through the Central Bank.
Iran's Central Bank has asked international lenders to reschedule its debt, while government officials are desperately pursuing new sources of external credit to repay their accumulating foreign obligations. Iran needs $18bn of new loans to cover the expected 2000 budget deficit, and to partially finance the necessary investment in the oil industry—an estimated $100bn will be needed over the next ten years.
Industrial output is on the verge of total collapse. The agriculture sector is even worse. In April 1999, the Iranian that it had attempted to buy $500m of American agricultural products four month earlier. Iranian officials complained about the "Great Satan's" delay in responding to their demand According to the US Secretary of Agriculture, the deal is "still under review."
Reliable statistics are hard to obtain. But many analysts say the country now suffers from unemployment of 40% or more.
The drop in oil prices over the last 12 months has aggravated Iran's economic problems. Oil revenue still accounts for a huge portion of the state budget. As the price of the crude oil has dropped to its lowest levels in 10 years, the Iranian government has lost more than 40% of its foreign currency
At the same time, the Iranian population has increased rapidly since the revolution. Half of Iran's 65 million people are under the age of 18. A least one million new jobs are needed every year, just to keep up with this youthful • population. The problem of unemployment is particularly acute among Iran's urban youth. Many are unable to find work, even after high school or university studies.
Many analysts are predicting "negative growth" in the country's GNP over the next 12 months. The rate of growth fell from 5% in 1994 to 2.5% in 1997, and 0% in 1998. Unless there is a sharp increase in the world price of crude oil—which is very unlikely-this economic crisis is very likely to have serious political implications, and potential violence during the Majles (parliamentary elections in the early part of 2000. Khatami's election
After years of warmongering, the regime was obliged to accept the end of the 8-year war with Iraq. To revenge their humiliation, Iran's leaders liquidated over 10,000 political prisoners in a few days-an unprecedented act of barbarism.
The regime decided to get rid of its political opponents abroad as well. It launched a vast terrorist operation abroad, assassinating more than 100 opponents The regime aimed to silence "noisy trouble-makers abroad" and tighten the screws of repression inside the country.
contents asia
2
Iran: Khomeni's heirs face the students • M. Agah
7
Lessons of the Iranian revolution
Pakistan's military takeover
8
• Farooq Tariq
9
Pakistan: LPP Punjab conference
10 India's rightward drift
• Kunal Chattopadhyay
East Timor's transitional
12 council • Solidarity still necessary • 4" International declaration
Australia: Victoria's left
26
• John Tully latin america
14 The neoliberal dissorder
• Ernesto Herrera
Blair and Schröder don't deliver
A hard look at Europe's new-style social democrats
16 Britain: Labour's rightward slide • Alan Thornett
20
Germany: One year of Red-
Green rule • Winfried Wolf
The PDS: a "social home"
23 for East Germans
• B. Ramolow
24 Farewell to the working class? • B. Zeuner europe
18 Norway's red vote
• Bjarke Friborg
19 Portugal: Left Bloc wins two MPs
27 A Balkan balance sheet
• 4" International document
30
Introducing the new
Balkans solidarity network society
31
Obituary • Emilio Amaya
32
The industry of sexual domination • Richard Poulin listings and reviews
36 Well Read: the radical press
36 Conference listing
3
International Viewpoint #316 November 1999
* Iran
But this violent backlash went too far, provoking international condemnation of the regime. It reached its peak in July 1996, when a German court officially condemned the regime's top office-holders for organising and ordering the assassination of Iranian opposition activists abroad.
The Iranian regime, which was desperately in search of new credits from international finance organisation, was so disgraced in the eyes of the world that it had no choice but to take some initiative to polish its image abroad. False democracy
And so, in June, 1997, Iranian people were offered a chance to take part in what the Islamic regime called a "presidential election" elections are normally considered to be a means of exercising the voters' political freedom to choose the government. In the Islamic regime they are used only to extend, deepen and strengthen the existing dictatorship They are almost a sham and fraud. The rival factions within the tightly managed "elections" to work out their internal power struggles enrichment, position and dominance and give a spurious stamp of legitimacy
Genuine elections demand maximum political freedom. But Iran's 1997 presidential election took place in such an atmosphere of repression, fear and terror that even Moussavi, Prime Minister from 1980-88, did not dare to stand as a candidate, because he is now outside the main faction in the regime.
Only four of the 234 prospective candidates were judged "fit" by the Constitutional Supervisory Council (a watchdog for the "Islamic" constitution. Those judged "unfit" included a former Speaker of the parliament, and an ex-head of government.
The regime's candidate among the "lucky four" was Nateq-Nouri, Speaker of the Islamic Parliament. Despite the massive propaganda machine, 70% of voters chose Khatami, head of the unimportant Ministry of Islamic propaganda in 1980-88, and outside politics since then.
Khatami promised law enforcement, preventing lawlessness and promoting openness within the framework of the system. He advocates an "Islamic civil society". If the hardliners model is the Saudi Arabian system of government, Khatami stands for the Pakistan model of Islamic democracy. [This article was written before the coup in Pakistan]. 4 International Viewpoint #316 November 1999
With strong participation of the women, youths youined 21 millions wals, intellectuals, versus nine million for his three adversaries all together. Equally surprising was the unprecedented turnout: 85%. The regime had to accept his victory as a fait accompli.
This massive vote for Khatami means a very big "NO!" to the regime as a whole. For the first time in many years, people had a chance to reject the regime, and express their desire for change. They grasped the occasion and used the election as a referendum to express their rejection of the regime.
In doing so, the "reformist" wing of the regime was born. This label was imposed by circumstances on an unwilling Khatami and his supporters inside the regime. Khatami has won support from the "left wing" of the regime-those who ruled the country for the first ten years revolution, but were pushed out of power after the Iran-Iraq war and the death of Khomeni. These "leftists" are now trying to surf on the new wave of popular struggle, reinventing themselves as "liberal democrats."
Twenty years ago, Iran's Stalinist left called this regime faction an "anti-imperialist" force-though fascists" would have been more accurate. After the death of Khomeini, Iran's (by now decimated) Stalinists thought they could distinguish this "left religious" current from the "traditional religious" and "modern right" factions in the regime. Now that Khatami has taken office, the Stalinists' terminology has again changed and they analyse the regime as having "reformist" and "totalitarian" wings. The only constant of this crude analysis is the Stalinists" desperate call for progressives to support the "reformists." Popular self-confidence
Following the remarkable defeat of the regime's presidential candidate, the masses regained their confidence. All section of Iranian society, specially women and youth, grasped any event to defy the system. Youth and women, whose votes brought Khatami to power, were particularly relieved at the easing of social restrictions, pushing the boundaries of Iran's strict Islamic law by displaying few centimetres of hair outside their compulsory headscarves. Women began to challenge restrictions on riding bicycles and attending football matches, leading to violent clashes between women and both the police and the regime's thugs.
The seeds of a freer press were also planted. Civil rights protests from writers became more frequent. Some clerics challenged the traditional rules. On 1st May 1999 workers defied a government ban, organised an independent rally and confronted police and paramilitary groups.
These multiple signs of protest encouraged even the extremely cowardly bourgeois nationalist leaders to call for
But the regime is deeply opposed to even the smallest changes in the system. The increasingly vocal press has been hobbled by hard-line courts. At least three pro-retorm publications have been closed since the beginning of 1999. Dozens of journalists have been arrested. Some have been harassed, others jailed.
Groups within the regime even organised the assassination of a dozen intellectuals active in a small group hoping to form a freelance writers guild, and the murder of an outspoken bourgeois nationalist opposition leader and his wife. But these assassinations boomeranged, when thousands of people attended the victims funerals.
The assassination of a dozen of intellectuals active in a small group hoping to form a freelance writers' guild, together with the murders of the an outspoken bourgeois nationalist opposition leader and his wife changed qualitatively the political scene of Iran. Their funerals attracted thousands, transforming their largely workaday lives into an emblem of people's desire to think and do what they want.
Government had to react. to this public pressure. After days of hesitation and manoeuvring, a governmental commission was established to investigate the killings. The commission reported daily to the president. According to Khatami's cabinet secretary, suspicion focused almost immediately on the government itself. On July. 6, the government admitted the involvement of state agents in the killings. Subsequent reports indicated as many as 12 agents, including Mr Emani, deputy minister in the intelligence
Meanwhile, hard-line elements in the conservative-dominates (Islamic parliament) finally succeeded in passing an extremely restrictive press law, on July 7. The following day Salaam newspaper was closed down, after it published a secret document showing that Emami had also advocated precisely this type of restrictive press law. [Emani died in prison in September. The authorities claim that he committed suicide by
International Viewpoint #316 November 1999 drinking a hair-removing solution. He and open trial for those who ordered was almost certainly murdered by the and carried out the attack on the student dormitories.
The mounting tension between the Students were also shot and pro-democracy movement and the savagely beaten in Tabriz city. The uniregime finally erupted into bloodshed versity's Islamic Students Council told when security forces and Islamic Khordad newspaper that at least 15 militants attacked a student protest over people were shot, including three the closure of Salaam. This sparked six women. What began as a peaceful campus sit-in turned into a scene of days of protest and repression.
On 9 July, at 4 o'clock in the bloodshed after police helped Islamic morning, the students' dormitories were vigilantes attack other demonstrators savagely attacked first by religious outside the university gates. Regime paramilitaries and then by members of paramilitary thugs then locked themstate security forces. They ransacked selves inside the university building, ripped the clothes off students and beat more than 2,000 rooms, burned books, stole whatever they could find, and beat them for hours, the council said. The thugs then went to a local hospital and students. There are confirmed reports abducted those students who had been that half-dozen were killed. One young wounded by gunfire. The Tabriz man visiting a friend in the dormitory atrocity was so horrible that the was thrown out of a third floor window regime's Minster of Higher Education talked of "the most criminal event in the
On 10 July, there was general history of the Iranian universities." condemnation of the savage actions of More than 1,500 people were the security forces. Most of the jailed arrested in connection with the disturstudents were released. News of the bances, including student leaders and brutal assault on the campus enraged prominent opposition figures. Authopublic opinion. Over 25,000 people rities say some of those released will be joined a protest rally in Tehran. Similar re-arrested when the investigation is demonstrations took place in all major complete. Nearly all arrested were under the age of twenty-the genera-
Students raised clear demands: free tion that has only known the Islamic speech; free regime. assembly, political parties, and associa- In fact, the "student movement" was tions; liberation of all political infiltrated and compromised by security prisoners; dismissal and open trials for agents and vigilante thugs-who those who ordered and carried out the disguised themselves by shaving their political assassinations of the last year; beards and changing out of their beaten arrested genuine
All two years.
movement.
This was regime's power.
failure.
forces.
student groups confirmed and as the called for has was a total
5
* Iran
More surprisingly, the western mass media supported the Iranian regime's version of events. Unsubstantiated reports claimed that "hundreds of thousands" had demonstrated. Instead of reporting from the scene, western media recycled films and photos from 20 years ago.
What began as a genuine, spontancous student uprising in defence of press freedoms and political reforms has now been appropriated by extremist religious paramilitaries and vigilantes aiming to discredit the students and provoke a crackdown by the regime.
With a remarkable political instinct, the students linked the regime corruption tos their central democratic demands. The leading regime circles do not cling on to their monopoly of power essentially because of ideological dogmatism or religion fanaticism. They cling on to it so as to defend and extend these material privileges.
Th Congres of the Fourth Internationa
Transformation and: regroupment Regroupments of forces determined to learn the lessons of the historical abomination that was Stalinism and to continue, against the winds and the tides, to fight against capitalism are being realised in a number of countries.
In all the countries where such possibilities exist, the organisations of the Fourth International are ready to be part of the re-groupment process. We consider this as an important step towards the recomposition of the anti-capitalist left on a world scale. At the international level, the Fourth International is an active participant in regroupment, bringing with it the advantages of a long tradition of combat against capitalism and Stalinism. * Price: E5/510. International Viewpoint, PO Box 27410, London SW9 9WQ, Britain.
international Viewpoint@compuserve.com> 6 International Viewpoint #316 November 1999
After the unrest
Khatami have repeatedly accused the conservatives of staging the unrest to topple Khatami or block his reform agenda, while conservatives have alleged the riots were a sign that Khatami's reforms have gone too far. A week after the suppression of the student movement, Khatami dismissed any appearance of a factional split in the government as an "illusion" while claiming the unrest was a "declaon his reform prog-
On the eve of the protests, the elite was divided. On one side Khamenei, whose support for a hardline reaction to the students puts him close to the ultra-conservative elements, very hostile to even the smallest liberalisation of the system. On the other side was Khatami who, after some hesitation, has become a supporter of a much more measured reaction to the students, and some kind of "controlled" opening in the direction of insignificant reforms.
But as soon as the movement crossed what the regime called the "red line" (i.e. rejecting the system) Khatami and his "reformist" faction quickly and without the least hesitation joined the "hard-liners." On 13 July he personally ordered the suppression of the student pro-democracy movement.
The massive reaction of various layers of society, including journalists and university teachers, in support of the students, has visibly disconcerted the regime.
The savage attack and atrocity by the security forces of the regime and Hezbollah gangs of club-wielders showed once again that the regime is not capable of reforming itself. Even a "reportedly honest" man like Khatami, with 21 millions votes in his pocket, can decessor, Rafsanjani.
Two weeks after the bloody crackdowns the conservative-dominated judiciary announced draconian "thought-crime" legislation which, if voted into law, would make almost any criticism of the Islamic regime a political crime.
One of those arrested, Manuchehr Mohammadi, a leading member of the National Association Students, appeared on state television shortly after the demonstrations "confessing" to his involvement with "counterrevolutionary agents".
In early September, just before the universities reopened, the regime announced death sentences against four students arrested in connection with student demonstrations. A few days later, the regime announced that two of the sentences had already been approved by the Supreme Court. No information as the identity of those sentenced or details of the charges and trial proceedings against them, is available.
As usual, the trials were conducted in complete secrecy, and with no proper procedure. Trial proceedings in Islamic Revolutionary Courts are held behind closed doors, often inside prisons. Lawyers and observers are excluded from the proceedings. There is no right to appeal.
It is too early to determine whether the reform era has abruptly ended or just suffered another painful birth pain. But one thing is certain: Iran is not the same as it was in July 1997. Very few of the 21 million Iranians who voted for Khatami had any illusion in any faction of the regime. Many are totally disillusioned with his demagogy, and the rest are very frustrated by his glacial pace of change. Pandora's box
The hard-liner Khamenei has been very badly humiliated. He will now try to play his role as the supreme judgearbiter, pushing the most extremist elements of the two factions out of the political scene, and putting order in the rival wings.
But he does not have the same authority as Khomeini had in the past, and Iranian society is not the same as it was ten or even two yéars ago.
The students have opened the "Pandora's box" of social and political demands. Nobody is capable of putting the spirit back into the bottle! Some student leaders have gone as far as announcing the end struggle, and the necessity of other methods." * New Publication In defence of Marxism #2
The latest issue of this Persianlanguage magazine includes: M. Agah's "Reflection on the Globalisation, "J. Kalibi on "Political Regime of the Bourgeois society," Ernest Mandel on "Marx, the Present Crisis and the Future of Labour," and Jesus Albarracin on "The Impasse of Market Ideology in France." Plus other essays and reviews Contact: DDM-IRA, La Bréche, 8 Rue de Romainville, 75011 Paris, France. Email <add_ira@voila.fr>