The prospects for authority of its institutions.
months, the government has been trying
Pinochet's crackdown to break the unity of the independence
It thought it had scored a success when the Liberation Kanake Socialiste (LKS) left the Independence Frent last July, coming out in support of the
On November 6 state of siege regulations were reimposed in the main
Lemoine scheme and deciding to partici-
The emergency measures include a permanent curfew pate in the elections.
But the results
(from midnight to five a.m.) in five cities, restrictions on public meetings proved not so satisfactory.
(which can be held only on the premises of the organisation involved or proved able to attract the support only of with the permission of the local military authority requested 10 days in advance) and a ban on the publication by the media of articles, interviews, a tiny minority, and then decided to withreports or images which could be deemed contributory to a disturbance of draw the six representatives it elected from the Territorial Assembly so as not to discredit itself any more.
The state of siege was declared after several protestas against the regime and the increasing growth of the underground opposition.
broadened with the entry of the Palika immediate response to the October 30 general strike which produced an
[Parti de Liberation Kanake, a group mainly in the youth that had for the strike in the industrial sector. The Pinochet regime has responded previously opposed the
Front for being in the most brutal fashion to this growing support for the opposition.
The repression marks the end of any pretence at liberalisation which proposals were aimed again at dividing had been pursued since 1980. Recent protestas have initially been weakthe independence forces and preparing ened in this context, with Santiago, the country's capital, now virtually the ground for a scheme of neocolonial under military occupation. Our correspondent was in the city when the independence that would preserve French state of siege was declared and he describes the situation there.
A few days ago, he submitted a draft government communique to the
FLNKS inviting "in particular the representatives of the FLNKS to discuss the conditions under which the Kanak people can exercise their right to self-determin-
On November 25, the FLNKS grabbed the ball and ran with it.
dissemination of Mr Lemoine's communique is a condition for the FLNKS immediately releasing Mr Demar, chief subdivision."
of the Iles Loyaute communique stayed in the desk drawer, probably on the decision of Paris.
The government wants to extend the status of independence to New Caledonia.
But the sort of "independence" it has in mind is one that would safeguard its control over raw materials, such as nickel, as well as its position in the Pacific trade, which plays a pivotal role in world comregions of Chile. public order. average 50 per cent absentee rate.
SANTIAGO DE CHILE - It seemed symbolic. On October 30, the day set for the first general strike in Chile, there was
But on November 7, when a state of siege was declared for the first time since 1978, it was as cold and rainy as the worst fall day. [Actually, it is late spring now in the southern hemisphere.]
Things are moving rapidly now in Chile, back and forth from hope to despair. Hopefully they will move as rapidly from fragmentation and ambiguity to unity and clarity in struggle.
The October 30 strike was an advance, but with limitations. It was not a total,
The planned strike activities were carried through only on a
But what is important is
There was a particularly good turnout spite the threat of shootings, despite the still poor level of trade-union tion, despite the fragmentation of the union movement, despite knowledge that the most important groups of workers already decided not to participate, despite the preventive mass arrests, spite all this and more, the city of Santiago was paralyzed by midday on Octo-
And not even the press most loyal to Pinochet could deny it. Bustos, the two foremost leaders of the CNT (Comando Nacional de Trabajadores - Workers National Command) declared that the strike had been an advance beyond what they dared hope, they meant
They themselves, like the Christian Democratic union leaders, had been skepthat despite negative starting points, de- tical about the possibilities for a strike.
Lemoine's proposals were an attempt
'For a general strike to bring down the dictatorship' (DR)
to gain the initiative before the radicalization of the Kanak masses made this impossible. They amount to an operation reminiscent of the one carried out in the
1950s in Africa - the establishment of an ambiguous transitional status opening the way for formal independence.
There are two obstacles to this project.
One is the demand of the colonists and
RA BOTAR LA DICTADURA the bourgeois opposition parties in France. The RPR remains the main political defender of colonial interests. The other is that the FLNKS program includes as a fundamental point that only the Kanaks should decide the future of the territory.
So, the path for the government is a narrow one. In fact, it could not find anything better to do than to send a negotiator who was a former director general of the national police. That was symbolic enough! 14
JUVENTUD Solida
International Viewpoint 10 December 1984
It was only after the and file organizations made decision on their own to strike that these leaders fell in behind the proposal. And even then they were hardly more convinced strike would actually come off than they were worried about losing their influence over the more militant groups of workers.
The CNT had developed a bad habit of launching proposals and then doing nothing to carry them out. happened in the case of this strike. Previously at the end of April, the CNT had voted to call a general strike within 90
But the months went by, and it was only after the September 4 and 5 days of protest, when Comfasin (a body that represents the union base organizations and the national federation) decided on their own to adopt a strike motion, that the CNT finally gave a concrete content to its old resolution. left the actual organization of the strike mainly to the base units.
On May 1, the CNT called for the forber 11" [The coup d'etat that put the dietatorship in power and resulted in mass imprisonments and the slaughter of
New repression in Chile (DR)
Pinochet has deported foreign priests before. But Ignacio Gutierrez is too high up in the Catholic hierarchy
20,000 people started on September 11, church or the Christian Democratic Party mation of Mesas de Concertacion, coordinating committees for various people's base organizations, to discuss political solutions for the situation in the country. But, as with its strike call, it did not go much beyond words. Such Mesas de Concertacion do exist today in Santiago, • but that is because the base organizations took up the task of implementing the CNT's proposal.
It was these Mesas de Concertacion that organized the strike through the neighborhood organizations, and the parties represented in them. But when the strike organized from below did actually come off, the CNT's leaders gave expression to what a lot of people thought: "Now there has to be an end to disastrous fragmentation, now there has to be a real, united, total action to get rid of the dictatorship." conscious that the strike had created a new situation in which they, and not the Democratic Alliance, stood in the forefront as the driving force in the opposi-
This change was also perceived by the Democratic Alliance, as well as other sections of the political opposition.
Thus, for the first time perhaps since September 1973, a possibility exists for united action against the dictatorship, not to force it to make certain concessions but to get rid of it once and for all.
Pinochet saw that. And that is why he raised the threat of a state of siege in advance of the strike. That is also why he declared the state of siege on November 6, exactly one week after the strike.
The two attacks on the police that followed the strike gave Pinochet the pretext he was looking for, but they were not the cause of his decision.
Already before these attacks, was a plan for "intensifying the struggle against terrorism." attacks, slingshots had been defined as a weapon in law, the possession of which means an automatic jail sentence. ready before the attacks, threatened to carry out a "new SeptemInternational Viewpoint 10 December 1984
Moreover, a lot of people are asking who it was exactly that carried out the attack against the policemen. No one has yet taken responsibility for it. has the capacity to carry out this type of attack? First a land mine was detonated by a remote control device and then there was a coordinated attack against a police then after such an attack, the authors just evaporated without making any statements! The questions remain.
But the most important unanswered question is what is going to happen now? In one respect, the answer is easy. But openings achieved by the struggle of recent years are being closed the headquarters of the Movimiento Democratico coalition including the CP, the Almeyda faction of the SP and the MIR) and of the Bloque Socialista have been taken over. Trucks carried away everything that was in them down to the last pencil stump. And unmarked cars took away all the
Many, perhaps all, of the headquarters of nonbourgeois opposition groups are coming in for the same treatment. A lot of left leaders are being sent into internal exile, and in some cases expelled from the
All meetings and political activity are being banned. The opposition papers and radio stations are being subjected to censorship or shut down altogether. The situation is hardening.
However, at the same time Pinochet is trying to get the non-Marxist opposition to enter into some sort of dialogue. He hopes that the internal elections coming up in the Christian Democratic Party will be favorable for him.
He is probably making a mistake, not in principle but because he put the cart before the horse, by launching a frontal attack on the Catholic church. He did this by refusing to allow the pastor of La Vicaria de Solidaridad, the Spanish priest Ignacio Gutierrez, to Chile from Europe, where he is now.
to accept such a measure against him.
Declaring a state of siege now is a sign
The mobilizations have been going on so long and have now involved so many people that they cannot be stopped, unless Pinochet carries out the same sort of total repression that was imposed in the wake of the coup.
The question, therefore, is this sort of repression is politically possible. The question is whether he may dig his own grave by provoking the sort of tensions in the armed forces that he has managed to avoid for the whole 11 years that he has been in power.
under a night-time curfew, Santiago is silent. Here and there, you hear footsteps, a voice over a loudspeak-
For a bomb exploding mood is nervous, a feeling of insecurity.
What will the response of the masses
It would be unrealistic to think that they are not going to be affected by fear. It would be wishful thinking to believe that there can be any spontaneous upthat Pinochet's repressive measures are automatically going to bring a reaction of greater unity and militancy.
However - and that is Pinochet's
- even if he can temporarily push the movement back, it will be difficult to defeat it altogether. Pinochet is more isolated than ever. tional Party is against him. tions of the bourgeoisie want to be rid of him. The US State Department sees him as a problem, as a factor promoting a radicalization of the struggle.
Moreover, the new generation that is now in the forefront did not experience September 11, 1973. They have a different sort of experience and a different sort of organization. For them, even a state of siege does not mean shattered illusions but a decade-old tyranny demonstrating its impotence. It may be that this is the prelude to the final act for
with the setting up of more than 1,000 rank and file committees in Montevideo, with between thirty to fifty activists in each. The committee members canvassed entire town meticulously, area by area and street by street.
For the leaders of the FA, the com-