BOLIVIA
Editorial
WE PUBLISH below a statement from the bureau of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International on the wave of anti-worker repression in Bolivia. The declaration was issued on September 23, 1985.
Since the appeal was launched some of those trade unionists who had been arrested, amongst them members of the POR-U (Partido Obrera Revolucionario- - Unificado), Bolivian section of the Fourth International have been released. Others have been deported to the Pando region including our comrade Eugenio Sanchez, a member of the national leadership of the COB (Central Obrera Boliviana), the main trade union federation.
As we go to press we learn that
October 3 the
COB called off on their strike. The hunger strike in the mines is continuing according to unconfirmed sources.
The revolution on
On August 29, the government of
Victor Paz Estenssoro, a government elected through rigged ballot, its sixth anniversary adopted a series of measures aimed to attack the standard of living and the democratic rights of the working class.
Inflation in the country is currently running at the unprecedented rate of 14,000%; wages have
ON THE SIXTH anniversary of the Nicaraguan revolution, the inbeen frozen for the past four months;
creasingly aggressive stance of US imperialism continues to be the the price of oil has risen ten times;
all subsidies on basic foodstuffs have dominant factor in the situation. The main priority has to be defence been withdrawn; the popular canteens of the revolution in face of the open desire of the Reagan administrahave been closed and finally the peso has been devalued by 95%. At the same tion to overthrow the Sandinista government.
workers in the public sector time,
The damage and the human losses brought about by the attacks have been threatened with sackings if they strike and those trade unionists of the counter-revolution on Nicaraguan territory have been on the who organise strike action will, from increase since 1983, the year when the contras began their first face six month now on, prison sentences.
On September 19, the government
Thus the number of battles recorded by the Nicaraguan authorput these measures into practice and ities went beyond 660 in 1983, 948 in 1984 and reached 710 for deported the entire leadership of the
(Central Obrera
Boliviana — the first six months of 1985. For the first part of 1985 it is calculated the main trade union federation) to that twenty health centres have been destroyed, as well as 14 schools the Pando region, the area where the dictator Banzer had previously estaand that a further 359 schools have been forced to close. Physical blished a concentration camp.
Other injuries and losses in production due to contra operations are estimated activists trade leaders, and union militants have also been hit; massive at 143 million dollars worth in 1983 and 187 million dollars worth have taken place and three arrests in 1984. This represents 40% and 53%, respectively, of the total thousand militants are now in jail.
Despite all the strike called by this, the against the government's went ahead. Fifteen days measures the strike call first went since out miners and factory workers are still
Because of out.
this, the government is threatening further now measures; they are seeking to break workers resistance through whatever means come to hand.
It is therefore vital that a campaign of international solidarity be organised and activated. All trade union and political organisations of the labour movement should make their protest heard.
In they should particular demand the release of all those militants imprisoned, the return of the their homes,
COB leaders to the lifting of the state of siege and the reestablishment of democratic rights.
International Viewpoint 14 October 1985 military operations of any scope. exports of Nicaragua. JEAN-CLAUDE BERNARD
In order to step up the military pressure, the contras have succeeded in the north of the country, in establishing 'regional commando squads' of 1,200 combattants apiece which, through forming a small coordinated group between them and with the help of very sophisticated communications systems, have penetrated Nicaraguan territory. The number of contras in operation at the present time is therefore in the order of several thousands. (1)
The contras' tactic is to pursue a war of attrition in order, over the medium term, to weaken the revolution's capacity for resistance. So, their attacks are becoming more and more selective, aimed mainly at the points vital for the development of the country and against the social gains made since 1979. They are also
Ia Contenrevolucion, datos basicon datos basicos, 1980-1985 Centro Internacional, Managua.
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NICARAGUA
politically selective. The producers' cooperatives started up by Sandinsta activists are coming in for more attacks than individual peasants.
During August 1985, the contras, in addition, launched a limited military offensive in order to gain greater international attention. They attacked a town of 10, 000 people on the Pan-
130 kilometers to the North of Managua and to the south of one of the cities where the revolutionary mobilization has
On August 1, a unit of 150 contras disguised as Sandinista army cannot have been to hold the town for long; it must have been simply to demonstrate that they had a real presence in the neighborhood of
The testimonies collected in the hospital exposed the fact that the contras are forcibly young teenagers. result is a very poor military quality of the contra mercenaries, who are more often used to stage murderous ambushes than for major confrontations with the militia and the Sandinista army. More US aid for the contras
This military weakness of the contras and their inability to strike decisive blows at the revolution must inevitably oblige Washington to increase its aid. The vote of the US congress to give official credits to the contras is going to escalate the amount of the support given to
The geographical extension of the military operational zones only affects Nicaragua's peripheral regions in the south, and Atlantic coast. This means that the contras' areas of activity remain quite to their training camps Honduras and in Costa Rica.
Within Nicaragua, the counterrevolutionaries can find places where they can get supplies through terror, corruption and manipulating real feelings of discontent, but their bases are not in the interior.
In combating this aggression, the defense effort of the revolution is based mainly on the productive workers of the cities and on the poorest section of the rural population, small peasants and agricultural workers. This is true, first of all, in strictly military terms. The centers where the militias are most active are the agricultural producers coop. eratives, the small-peasant villages, and the urban enterprises.
Reconstruction in Nicaragua (DR)
In the northern regions, the militias are directly involved in the organiconfrontation with the contras. As exemplified by the Somoto region, about 15 kilometers from the Honduran border, the militia is made up of people assigned by each of the cooperatives in the local complex. They serve for six months.
In the building for the chief of the border guards, young militia members stand guard. They are directly subordinate to the local commander of the Sandinista army. He himself, as he explained to me, sees his task tied up with the political and military organization of the
Region VI, the one around Esteli, more than half of the production workers are mobilized in the militias or in the military service.
that was established in 1984, with the setting up of the patriotic military service, had the explicit objective of broadening the base of the military defense. Nonetheless, a lot of the bourgeoisie are their offspring abroad in order to get them out of serving the revolution. The result is that the military service is assumed mainly by young people who come from the social base of the revolu-
However, the scope of the confrontation under way in Nicaragua revolution counterrevolution cannot be reduced military aspect alone. The concentration of efforts on assuring the defense and survival of the revolution is leading to a very serious situation and a decline in the standard of living of the production workers. In this area as well, it is they bearing the basic burden of the defeconomic are growing worse. The pressure of the military aggression is combining with embargo and quences of the international economic crisis to strangle Nicaragua and keep from developing the country. Half of the national budnow going for defense, and service on the foreign debt is absorbing than half the income whose dollar declining (although the actual amounts exported remain constant). So, there is a scarcity of foreign exchange for imports, and spending for internal needs is being squeezed. Growing economic difficulties
Several phases have to be distinguished in the first six years of the revolution with respect to the economic evolution and its impact on the standard of living of the population. In the first two years, th of the most pressing tasks of reconstruction gave rise to a growth much greater than that of the other Central American countries.
The owners of the means of prothe big agricultural estates could keep their way of life accepted being deprived of political power. On the other hand, the standard of living of the poorer sections of the population improved both qualitatively and quantitatively. The social base of the revolution was the first to benefit from through the efforts made in education, health, and in making it easier for the people to acquire the necessities
From 1981 to 1983, blows from the imperialists forced the revolutionary government to make an abrupt change in imports policy. Only those most important to meet the needs of the country's economic International Viewpoint 14 October 1985
development consumer.
buy this could even cheaper for some cases, duction.
problems masses the drop in the minimum the at 30%. (2)
year.
is set in trade change a rise sections of the have to measures.
1, worsens
May cushion the of power ments in products was the case textile to them on the have flourished en visaged productive special supply slowly than minimum wage continued.
The prices the in
Nicaragua of on the basis of the sale prices impossible to
For that year, power of estimated is the cordobas cordobas to that will of these of the situation to
In order currency obthe given to
This in the
The and in order
Managua.
The it measures, was wages of the and up open reserved for in fact, been in-
In от 3,000 the ends alone.
Th
100%.
tion the the has been mobil workers section that tion bears dance with criteria in fail to with precarious
Th the try to and commitments to trade-union put
FSLN to take explai development of is all the the moveaffects and in this ment, more strate its vanguard role has
Barric associated with the vestig of came resence people from inflation of ssuring the and speculate.
indiof
The "informal sector"
ems rising prices, long of the economy blems,
July
These are not just marginal pracof ead tices by a bourgeois layer that can be the series.
easily pinpointed. They reflect deeper eople"
problems.
Growing at a economic orkers rate of 6% a year, the population of
Daniel
Managua has a million, the
Ortega working traditional the he two to the and
N)
Communist Party the industry, more-
It find active vorkers selfare with that result
The gap in or of the of tion to the to the vendor is about wages.
Rank-and-file workers raised their attacked one or problems.
alongproductive inswers means of plexity
This about quickly, subsidies draw in can referred to the initially serialist the ng had on big
The superother to accept social strata
2. 'Pensamiento Propio', April 1985.
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picture.
Reagan envia otra flota
de guerra al Allanteso July 1983: 'Reagan sends another military fleet to Nicaragua' (DR)
The Sandinista Workers Confederation (CST) is the urban mass organization that confronts most directly the problems affecting production workers. This organizaiton dates back the revolution, and thus is still in a stage of consolidation. It has to forge a whole generation of activists to give impetus to mass activity in working class. Facing the competition of the other union confederations, whose influence has greatly declined but which have maintained the confidence of veteran the workers the CST is reflecting the discontent that is widespread among wage earners both about wages and supplies.
In August 1985, the CST started up activity on September was summed
"The CST calls on all Nicaraguan workers to take up a mass discussion for the following objec-
"To measure the successes problems in the work of the union to carry out the resolutions adopted by the Fourth National Assembly of the Unions and the orientations of the National leadership of the FSLN.
evaluate the positive effects of the economic measures taken by the revolutionary government in latest aggressions by imperialism.
"To present our own proposals vigorously to the revolutionary government with respect to wages and prices policy, supply, work contracts, and the commitments of the union movethe areas of military defense, rationalizing our human and material resources." (3)
In the Managua region, more than belonging to more than 15 enterprises participated in the preparatory assemblies. In its 6
August 19 issue, Barricada presented some of the conclusions assemblies: "The workers raised the problem of the supply centers and expressed the opinion that the prices are too high by comparison with production costs. The workers consider that the excessive bureaucracy of the institutions leads to a series of deficiencies in public administration and in the resolution of problems. They pointed out those institutions that have not given necessary support to the innovations campaign [that is, the workers proposing technical innovations to cushion parts owing to the US embargo]. They noted that there has been lack of speed on the part of the Ministries of Labor and Industry in offering a response to the financial problems of the enterprises. They called for a review of the workers wages and for a rapid solution to pending cases. In the application of the austerity and economy measures, they have found resistance from the administrators, and they demand that these measures be applied not just to the workers but to all sectors." (4) The morale of the
While the decline in the standard of living is undeniable, it is not producing a loss of political confidence the revolution, its vanguard. Tangible proofs of this are the success of the July 19 celebration, as well as the inability of the forces FSLN to crystallize the discontent
The effect of the political comprothe regime has made in order to divide the bourgeoisie should also be considered. The Sandinistas have sought to involve some of them in the battle for production. Along with this, they have tried to get diplomatic support from other countries in Latin America.
These compromises are leading to inequalities in living conditions between the productive workers mobilized in the mass organizations that support the revolution and the bourand trading strata that have been deprived of political thus an unstable balance between the demands of mass work focused on the social base of the revolution, and the demands imposed by the political compromises that have been made to gain breathing space become more difficult than in the period when the revolution could begin to satisfy the immediate demands of the poorest sections
All these factors are leading to a more complex situation for the mass organizations whose function is both to apply the orientations of the FSLN national leadership and to be the organized means for expressing the immediate aspirations of the masses.
One of the most striking characteristics of the Nicaraguan situation is the continuing capacity of these organizations to mobilize, when the war of aggression against Nicaragua is naturally tending to impose a united political-military command at all levels. Such features are still more marked in the countryside, in which progressive application opening up for new advances benefiting the poor peasants. Moreover, the peasantry is dictions that make it the immediate battle ground between the revolution and the counterrevolution.
The agrarian reform has continued to advance at the same rate since 1981, without policy that has been in effect up now is being changed in two respects. On the one hand, the cooperatives, to which most of the land was given, are getting a lower priority. In Region VI, Esteli, where there is a sharp social polarization between the mobilized poor peasants and the counterrevolution, the tendency has been for land grants to be given more to individual peasants.
Moreover, there have been cases, tated to upset its plans in order to respond more rapidly to the demands of the peasants. What has happened in the Masaya region, sixty kilometers south of Managua is indicative of this focus of military attention, since it is far from the areas where the contras
So, it did not get priority for solving the problems that might exist. Thus, six years after the revolution, many poor peasants managed to survive on their tiny holdings, and were obliged to go to work as day laborers on the big cotton plantations or livestock ranches in the dry zone, in the northern part of the
These big estates belonged, notably, the president of the COSEP, the confederation of emp
The peasant mobilization that began in June, thus, had a target particularly representative of the bourgeoisie that remains in Nicaragua. Demonstrations and marches want Bolanos' land: He's got a lot
The movement was largely taneous at the start, but very quickly, the National Union of Farmers and
"Trabajadores,' August 1985 'Barricada,' August 19, 1985. International Viewpoint 14 October 1985
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3.