The Seoul spring
ON MAY 24, 1991, South
Korean president Roh Tae
Woo appointed a new prime minister and reshuffled his government. After several weeks of "firmness" in response to the opposition movements, the president had finally been forced to give way, in preparation for the
June 20 local elections, in which his ruling Democratic
Liberal Party scored a sweeping victory.
ENZO TRAVERSO
T HIS was his reply to a growing
wave of student mobilizations which was unleashed by the death under torture on April 26 of Kang Kyung Dae, a 20 year old student arrested by police at a demonstration. The ferocity of the police repression, the radicalization of the student movement, the alarming increase in the number of victims of government intransigence, had once again plunged the country into chaos and a spiral of violence. Once again the capital Seoul and the country's other main cities saw tens, perhaps hundreds of thousands of demonstrators and special anti-riot units involved in bloody clashes that would, if they continued, profoundly shake the regime.
The world's press was unanimous in that these demonstrations were the most important since
Tae-woo came to power four years ago in the free elections that followed the fall of the military regime of Chun
Doo Hwan.! This time the revolt was spurred by the deaths of eight students who set themselves alight to protest against the lack of liberty and to demand the resignation of the prime minister, considered to carry the main responsibility for the
Over the past three years, the international prestige of the South Korean government and its president has been firmly on the rise, thanks to the impression of modernity fostered during the
Seoul Olympics in 1988, the increasing economic room for manoeuvre of a regime that had previously been totally subordinate to the United States, the increasing difficulties of the North Korean regime following the collapse of the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, and finally, due to a flexible foreign policy that has seen South Korea establish diplomatic relations and intensive commercial relations with the Soviet Union and its former allies.
Roh Tac Woo's visit to Moscow in December 1990 led to an agreement on a $3bn credit to the Soviet Union, casting the South Korcan president in the role of a leader of a great power, however misIcadingly. Relations between North and South Korea have undergone a profound
SOUTH KOREA change in the past three years, to Seoul's advantage, as is shown by the recent decision by Pyongyang 10 abandon its opposition to the simultancous admission of both Koreas to the United Nations, in to forestall South Korea's entry
However, this international prestige is inside the country, where political tension remains high. For one thing, nobody in South Korea has forgotten that, as an army general, Roh Tae Woo took part in the 1980 military coup that broughi Chun Doo Hwan — one of the most hated figures in the whole of modern Korean history — to power. For another, the worker and student movements can explode at any time and maintain a high level of mobilization. The plan — similar to those being implemented in much of Latin America — of turning South Korea into a democratic regime under military tutelage can draw strength from high living standards, but also confronts permanent
Students seen as the conscience of the nation
Enjoying considerable social respect and often considered as the conscience of the nation in a country where traditionally the "lettered" (Sa) have formed a caste at the top of the social hicrarchy, the students have always been in the forefront of the struggle for democracy; from 1960, when they brought down the military regime of Syng Man Rhee, to 1987, when their actions set off a vast social mobilization which sounded the end of the corrupt regime of Chun Doo Hwan and the passage to a more democratic political system.
The student movement contains the whole spectrum of the left, from social democrats to Trotskyists, not forgetting those moved by the thoughts of North Korean leader Marshal Kim Il Sung. But it seems increasingly to converge around a number of central demands, such as respect for democracy, the release of the many political prisoners, and the withdrawal of the 40,000 American troops stationed in the country since the end of the civil war, these latter being widely scen as the symbol of a former "colonial" dependence which is becoming ever harder to tolerate. Finally there is the issue of the reunification of the peninsu1. Sce International Herald Tribune, April 30, 1991 and Le Monde, May 15, 1991. 2. Le Monde, May 29, 1991. 3. See Bruce Cummings in New Left Review, February 1989 and Daniel Schirmer: "Korea and the Philippines; a century of US intervention" Monthly 15 Review, no. 1, 1991. July 8, 1991 • #210 International Viewpoint
SOUTH KOREA la.
Although not directly led or manipulated by Pyongyang, despite some links, a significant current in the student movement bases itself on the juche ("identity") principle promulgated by the North Korean regime since 1955, and regards the regime north of the 38th parallel as a model of national liberation. This current preaches an ideology that is a melange of Marxism and Confucianism, giving rise to a form of nationalism with definite xenophobic notes, which identifies Korean national identity with the Kim Il Sung cult.
The populist exaltation of the masses (minjung "the people") and the nationalist mysticism characteristic of this current, which is probably the most important in the radical left, is matched by great combativity, courage and determination. This is also a factor in their preferred forms of protest, among them the self-immolations which have resulted so far in eight deaths. It is a practice that draws on a still living Buddhist tradition that survives bencath the modernization and secularization of the socicty, which exalts the notion of sacrifice.
However this form of protest is even more a reference to the history of the South Korean workers' movement, whose rising curve was marked in 1970 worker, Chun Tae Il, who wanted to make a protest against the living working conditions of the South Korean
Besides this current, known as National Liberation (NL), which makes reunifianother which makes support for workers' struggles its priority, and underlines the importance of the social contradictions in South Korean society.
These two currents, whose origins go back thirty years, have shown themselves capable of mobilizing some thousands of students on a permanent basis, and also exert a considerable cultural influence. A large proportion intelligentsia now considers itself Marxist, and the bookshops of Seoul and Pusan are full of Marxist works. In the Europe, the movement is pluralist and extremely diverse, looking to different 16 International Viewpoint #210 • July 8, 1991 traditions and nourished by a revolutionary culture in which can be found both the best and the worst, from Walter Benjamin to Kim Il-sung.
A clandestine edition of the Marshal's writings is currently being widely disseminated on the campuses, where it can easily be purchased. At the same time, since the nearly total ending of censorship three years ago, Korean translations of virtually the whole of the Marxist tradition are available in bookshops, from Marx to Trotsky, Rosa Luxemburg to Lukacs, Gramsci to Marcuse, from the Frankfurt School to New Left Review, from Althusser to Mandel
One of the reasons for the high level of political mobilization, not only of students but of the whole of democratic public opinion in South Korea, is the large number of prisoners of conscience who rot in the country's jails.
### Repression continues despite election pledge
As could be expected, Roh Tae Woo's government has done the opposite of promised during the 1987 election campaign that brought him to power. In those days he affirmed that "national security will no longer be a pretext for restricting liberty and human rights in this country." Today 398 prisoners, 32% of the total number of prisoners of conscience, are held under the National Security laws imposed forty years ago to suppress the Communist
Overall there are some 1,300 political prisoners in South Korea today, or an average of 3.7 arrests a day since February 1988, when the democratic opening gave way to a new wave of repression. Most are students (567) and workers (430). Among them are the main leaders and activists of the student movement (Chondaehyup), of the movement for national reunification (Chunminryun) and above all of the new unions grouped Chunnohyup organization.4
The presence jail of 151 selfconfessed Communists should also be noted. Unwilling to renounce their ideas, some of them have been in jail for decades. In fact, the number of 1,300 prisoners is only the tip of the iceberg of repression; there are also hundreds of militants arrested for shorter periods during strect demonstrations and clashes with the police. Last year, for example, more than 500 students were arrested for throwing molotov cocktails (a practice that these days seems more popular than traditional martial arts among the youth).
It is also significant that the breadth of the protests ended up shaking the discipline of the anti-riot units themselves; 22 soldiers from these units have been for refusing to take part repressive actions. The struggle for the liberation of prisoners came on centre stage at the start of last year with the sentencing of Im Su Kyung, a 22-year old student, and the 61-year old Rev Moon Kyu Hyun, for having gone to North Korea to further the cause of reunification. When they returned to Seoul, where they knew they would be arrested under the National Security Law, their arrest aroused immense emotion. The regime had to sentence them while knowing that this would turn them into national heroes. They got in fact ten years in solidarity mobilizations forcing the sentences to be reduced to
The workers movement has been profoundly affected by repression. At the start of last year the founding congress of Chunnohyup took place at Souwon, an industrial suburb of Seoul. It was broken up by police and several leaders arrested A year and a half later, the union can feel that it has achieved a real success in keeping going despite the heavy repres-
Today it organizes 190,000 workers grouped in 14 regional federations which in turn group together various unions organizing particular jobs.
Strikers defy police for two
Its baptism of fire came a few months after its birth, with the strike in one of the biggest South Korean workplaces, the Hyundai naval shipyards at Ulsan. Here the confederation's activists played a leadership and organizing role allowed the workers to hold out for two weeks against 18,000 armed police.? This strike received the support of around 200,000 workers throughout the country.
Chunnohyup remains a minority force in the union movement, and its membership is only a small fraction of the workforce of some 10 million. The main union confederation, the Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU), "moderate" and recognized by the government, has three times as many members. However what has allowed Chunnohyup to keep going despite the arrest of almost all its leaders, is the fact that it is rooted in the country's main industrial bastions. During 1990, its militants replaced the former workplace delegates in the union elections in several major South Korean enterprises, such as the naval shipyards and the Daewo car factories. This trend is continuing this 4. Korea Report, News and Analysis of Korean Affairs, (Washington) No. 11, 1990. 5. Their situation has been denounced by Amnesty Interational in its annual report. 6. International Viewpoint no. 180, March 13, 1990. 7. IV, no. 184, May 7, 1990. 8. See the pro-govemment review, East Asian review, Korea and World Affairs, no. 4, 1990.
The platform of Chunnohyup
1. We will struggle for a decent life by fighting for wage Increases and also for the 44 hour week.
2. We will struggle to abolish wage discrimination based on occupation, sex and educational background. We demand a falr wage system
That provides equal pay for equal work
3. We will struggle for a secure employment system that eliminates unfair dismissal and provides living allowances and job training for the unemployed
4. We will struggle for a safe working environment that prevents
Industrial hazards and occupational diseases.
5. We will struggle for the right to organize and bargain collectively.
6. We will struggle in unity against the government and management repression of the labor movement.
7. We will struggle for guaranteed housing, free universal education, medical Insurance, price stabllization, environmental protection, welfare increases and tax reforms.
8. We will struggle against sexual discrimination and for maternity rights.
9. We will struggle for a healthy minjoong (people's) culture to resist the decadence of foreign cultural invasion.
10. We will struggle for the guarantee to all the Korean people of the freedom of the press, expression, assembly, association, demonstration, and thought and other basic civil rights
11. We will struggle in firm solidarity with other popular forces for democracy, Independence and the reunification of our motherland.
12. We will struggle for international peace by fostering solidarity with our fellow workers all over the world.
(from Korea Report, Washington DC, August/September 1990) *
Chunnohyup is thus a vanguard union, directly organizing a minority but now able to lead the struggles of the strongest and politically most militant sectors of the workers movement. Despite the repression, its organizations are regarded as legitimate by the workers, and this has forced the enterprises to recognize the union, despite the intransigent attitude of the government.
Chunnohyup is the product of a new generation of workers, born of the South
Korean economic miracle, formed by the struggles of the 1980s and radicalized by the fight against Chun Do-hwan's military dictatorship. The average age of the leaders is about 30. This is a young working class, which, despite harsh represimportant victories.
for example, have risen by around 20% since 1987. The working week has been reduced and struggles have taken place over working conditions
- faced with a situation where there have been 15,000 deaths in industrial accidents in the past decade, 2,236 of them in 1990.8
There are many women in Chunnohyup, whose demands include maternity rights (a period of paid leave after the birth with the assurance of getting the job back) and the abolition of all sexual discrimination (most working women are unmarried young women who earn considerably less than men doing comparable work). Mainly concentrated in the textile industry and electronics, women are the most exploited layer of the South Korean working class; it is estimated that 98% of women workers work longer hours than the legal limit (41.5% more than nine hours and 22.5% more than ten hours a day). The result is work related illness such as anaemia, which afflicts 12.7% of women factory work-
Chunnohyup's strongholds country's big enterprises, the site of the in recent years. To give only a few examples, the unions in the Chunnohyup confederation organize 20,000 workers in the steel plants in Pohang; 19,500 in the Hyundai naval shipyards at Ulsan; 13,500 in the Daewo car factories at Incheon near Seoul; and 10,150 in the Daewo naval shipyards at
Chunnohyup unionists from 16 of the biggest enterprises, organizing 109,000 workers, held a conference on December 9, 1990, to establish a national coordination. They decided to launch a national campaign around four main axes: a) to crcate a united movement against antistrike legislation and anti-union repression; b) to defend the unity and indepenmovement; c) to strengthen the solidarity initiatives linking unions in the big enterprises in the different regions of the related. The leader of this new national coordination is 31-year old Pak Sun Hwan, the president of the union in the Ulsan naval shipyards. Although it had been declared illegal and was threatened with dissolution by the government, on this occasion the conference was able to proceed normally.
The importance of this new coordination becomes clear in the light of the structure of the South Korean economy, which is one of the most concentrated in the world. The economy is controlled by a few massive conglomerates (chaebol) comprising several branches practically every productive sector. In 1990, overall sales of the products of the four main chaebol (Samsung, Hyundai, Lucky Goldstar and Daewo) amounted to $135bn, that is, more than half of the South Korean GNP.!
This extreme concentration is one of the main problems of the South Korean economy. The extensive pattern of development of the chaebols has created an economy which is vulnerable to the increasingly fierce foreign competition. To keep its position on the world market, South Korean has to diversify production and improve quality, which requires an improvement of the existing technological level.
Heavy industry and draconian protectionism
The South Korean economic miracle was based on heavy industry and other sectors with low capital intensity, which have permitted the creation of more sectors. Thanks to draconian protectionist measures, these products have been guaranteed the home market, where cars, telecommunications and electrical goods are all made in Korea. But they are far from able to make an impact on the world market.
On the other hand, the existence of these massive industrial centres favours the organization and rapid extension of workers' struggles, as the past few years have shown. If strikes at Hyundai or Daewo spread to the enterprises at other chaebols, the whole South Korean economy is immediately paralyzed. It is this that explains the impressive wage gains of recent years. After the fall of the military dictatorship and the expansion of the domestic market owing to the country's economic development it is no longer possible to deal with the "worker question" by pure repression as in the past. 9. Korea Labor, KRIC Monthly Newsletter, Seoul, No. 4, December 1990. 17 10. Ibid 11. Financial Times, April 10, 1991. July 8, 1991 • #210 International Viewpoint
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SOUTH KOREA country; d) to work for a social move- ment to pursue demands concerning ser- vices and the quality of life, such as transport, crèche facilities and social security, that are not directly factory-