International Viewpoint Archive

The Fourth International’s English-language review, from 1982

Report 2: The Kurds and Turkey: Extracts from the Testimony of PKK Leader 'Apo' Öcalan

International Viewpoint No. 315, September 1999 · pp 18-24 · 4,810 words

Middle East

Öcalan used his showtrial to focus Turkish and Kurdish attention on what he says is a historic opportunity to solve the Kurdish question. The PKK should abandon violence and separatism, Turkey should accept the Kurds as a fundamental, constituent element of the Turkish Republic.

Öcalan's proposals are not to everyone's liking. The Turkish state could be strengthened, without becoming more democratic, and without ending the "Kurdish questions"— which predates the PKK. DJD]

18 International Viewpoint #315 October 1999

Judge for yourself... These extracts are taken from the "Full Defence Testimony" published in the English section of the central PKK website. Selection, emphasis and subtitles by Jean Dupont of International Viewpoint. 66The Kurds are one of the founding members of the Turkish Republic. So why did the displaying of their identity became the greatest problem in the period of founding and development of this country? Kurds should be redefined as one of the fundamental dynamic elements of society, conscious free citizens and as a social group of the Republic...

What needs to be changed is not the Kurdish phenomenon, but the laws that cannot express it adequately and in a democratic manner. The Kurds have proved the following: If you don't recognise our freedom, separatism and rebellion will always be on the agenda. Either I enter into a free union with you or I die or run away." Not to see this cannot be regarded as protecting the

66 Despite all its utopian and extreme political approaches, the PKK has played an historic role by presenting the problem and the need for a solution in the most striking way and by making a solution necessary. Despite all the problems of methods, its hard-line political approach and its confusion of the ideological and the political.

It has paid the highest price not only to have the existence of Kurds accepted but also to stop it being a problem. It has lost almost 25 thousand members. More than 10 thousand of its members have been sentenced to prison for periods of up to 20 years. Millions have been forced to move. More than 3,000 villages belonging to the masses from which the PKK derives its strength have been emptied.

These facts not only indicate the source of the problem; they also indicate the fact that a solution must be found...

The accusation against me should say not that the PKK calls for a separate state, but that it very clearly calls for a democratic republic. This is not separatism but perhaps a move for the greatest union with Turkey and the Turks, a move towards strength amd once again becoming a leader in Middle East, the Caucasus and Balkans. There is no way of ach this other than through a free u

Socialism is dead?

At the start of this century, socialism represented the highest stage of democratic progress and its most egalitarian and free expression. Beginning with the upheaval in Russia, socialism exerted considerable pressure on capitalism. But, at the end of the century, socialism has virtually died though shortness of breath.

This happened because, like many systems, socialism was rigid. It could not open channels within the system to the freedom and equality that are part of its essence.

And it failed to carry forward to the people the positive economic and political developments experienced even under capitalism. The presence of a type of intense sectarianism also encountered in religions was also a factor here.

This does not mean that socialism left no positive legacy. The historic role it played in bringing about the social and national institutions that characterise our age and in the emergence of classes and nations enjoying a greater degree of equality cannot be disputed.

What capitalism had achieved in only a limited way over several centuries, socialism exceeded in half a century. Its inability to provide a solution to the heavy global crises, in which capitalism played the fundamental role, is not entirely its fault. However, because it was held responsible for finding a solution, it either had to find one or go under.

There is no doubt that it will flower again. The socialist experiment, which has left a great experience behind it, will form a synthesis between its achievements and what it has to achieve. The new radical priorities are nature and the environment, women, children and population, history and culture, ethnic and religious minorities and the solution of national situations and social imbalances.

It will reach its period of maturity and renew itself by adding to the democracy that led to its downfall everything from the ways in which even capitalism can be used to the aforementioned ethnic and cultural groups, so as to reach its broadest democratic system. Capitalism incorporated the achievements of socialism into its own democracy, even allowing the founding of Communist parties. The capitalists paid more attention to the human rights at the roots of socialism than socialism itself, and thereby outstripped socialism. But the new socialism will incorporate all the values of capitalism and of all human history. ...socialism in Turkey

The transfer of socialism to Turkey was conducted in a more eclectic, slavish and schematic manner than that of capitalism. Domestic social thinking was at a low level of development and dogmatic. It was thought that, instead of identifying and analysing social International Viewpoint #315 October 1999 19

* Kurds & Turkey characteristics, it would be sufficient to apply socialism in a schematic manner to achieve progress. Socialists were prey to vapid generalisations and were slipshod in practice.

It might be enough to say "There is no god but Allah, and Mohammed is his prophet" to become a Moslem. But socialism in Turkey in the 1970s was even more of a mechanical exercise and even more irresponsible. Socialists did not have an approach befitting the seriousness of their ideology. The chance to establish a democratic movement that would have provided the most results historically was lost and extreme violence caused a reaction on the part of society at large Inevitably, the classical right and conservative trends gained ground. Once again the law that states if you can't pose the right solution, you will go under" applied... The slow road to peace...

The PKK was born amid the whirlpool of these turbulent years. We did not have much difficulty in grasping the Kurdish Question and partly solving it in a manner that was nearly right. Consequently, we developed rapidly.

Contrary to the claims made by some, this was not fundamentally due to violence. Violence was the result of the level of social contradictions. It was like picking a ripe fruit on the principle of "Strike and it'll drop". Here the belief of the leader and the fulfilment of the requirements based on certain fundamental truths were enough for a start. It was especially easy to outstrip similar groups, cross official and unofficial barriers and to be striking with the very first actions undertaken by the organisation. Even an amateurish approach was sufficient. In less than a decade we surpassed similar groups, outgrew the ideologies of the system and challenged the feudal barriers.

By the 1980s, the system had been transcended both feudally on the local level and officially on the general level.

It was clear that ideological and political systems and barriers could no 20 International Viewpoint #315 October 1999 longer be a deterrent. This rested on the power of a socialism that was not understood in any depth and of Kurdish consciousness of history and society which were once again poorly examined and superficial. In other words, these were enough for an amateur

Only the army could stop this development, and indeed that was what happened. There was, however, a partial response to this in the form of the refuge found in the Middle East and the situation was partly transcended by the time we arrived at the 1990s. Of course this did not amount to the defeat of the army. It was only a striking proof that the classical method of suppression of the army could be transcended, perhaps for the first time in history. The Turkish state changes...

The response to this by the army and the state was the recognition of the Kurdish problem and the acceptance of a limited solution in official quarters. This was indeed an historic develop ment. In the context of the realities of Turkey it was the ultimate point to arrive at, no matter how much one fought beforehand. The Kurdish reality, whose main features as a founding element of the Turkish Republic had been suppressed and frightened into submission, had turned into an ugly

The formed his new government, Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel said at Diyarbakir, recognise the Kurdish reality". The same point was made in a more comprehensive manner by President Ozal and became the first item on the agenda for all official and unofficial parties and milieus. This shows that there was a chance of solution. The problem was a big one, but approaches to it were superficial. This was true of the PKK as well. A partial cease-fire was a bold move, but the parties did not have the necessary depth and

With the traditional rebellious stance being dominant on the part of the PKK and the traditional suppressive stance being dominant on the part of the state, the chance of an historic solution was missed. Needless to say, opportunist politicians, provocations and the influence of outside powers played a large role... ...the PKK was too rigid

During this period the state was undergoing serious changes. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the aftermath of the Gulf War made it vital to find a solution for the Kurdish problem. The route lay through a belated comprehensive democratisation. But the PKK resisted, proclaiming itself as the only solution. In reality, from the collapse of the socialist system it should have deduced a

The PKK should have seen that the principle of "self-determination of was no longer valid Scientific-technical developments had undermined the concept of the nation state produced by developments from the seventeenth century onwards. A solution based on developing democracy within the existing borders without altering these borders in any way was more realistic.

To put it briefly,the PKK should have abandoned its programme dating from the 1970s and embarked on a new programme. It should have analysed Turkey again, taking into account the development the country had undergone both when it was being founded and in the 1990s, and it should have based its programme on these new developments. Socialist systems were collapsing all over the world, the Soviet Union was falling apart, and a blind and lame democracy was being looked to for a solution...

The PKK should have drawn important conclusions from this. But we continued to call for a separate state, something that did not transcend an ideologically utopian rhetoric. It should have opted for a democratic society within the same borders, the trend all over the world. It should have clearly seen and shown the free union of Kurds with the Republic. Especially with extreme intermingling, intense assimilation, and half the population

being in a different geographical region, the solution to be arrived at and preferred was a deeper democracy.

The PKK should have found the language for this and, instead of the violence, which worsened, should have moved towards a line of action that concentrated political-democratic activity. It should have seen that even continuous guerrilla activity against the army could play no other role than eventually arriving at the same solution and should have placed a controlled transformation into a political-legal alternative on its agenda...

After 1993, the PKK should have seen the changes in both the world at large and the state at the start of the 1990s and come up with a response. Although it sensed this and felt the need for it, lack of experience and fear played an important role in preventing it. The PKK was not defeated during this period, but nor did it develop.. Time to change

The PKK is genuinely at a major crossroads. It could harden its traditional line, and continue its existence with the help of extensive domestic and foreign resources. Or it will abandon the armed struggle, on the basis of certain legal assurances. In other words we would make the unity of Turkey the basis of our programme and turn the PKK into an organisation that is based on transforming a better understood Kurdish society through political-legal action and organisation.

This is definitely the historical stage that has been arrived at. This transformation, far from being seen as a renegade act or elimination, should be seen as a truly revolutionary trans-

The alternative, i.e. the failure to achieve a transformation in the approach and organisation, will lead to extreme conservatism and eventually elimination. Or, like similar organisations, the PKK will descend into a hard-line sectarianism. What the PKK must do is, without allowing disintegration, to move slowly with a common will from guerrilla warfare to an assurance-backed solution based on a democratic Turkey and towards the political-legal process and its line of action..

This is a problem and a solution leadership. Undoubtedly, it would have been healthier under free conditions...

At this stage in its history, the PKK should behave in a mature and self-confident manner while setting a new course for itself. Self-examination and the identification of fundamental errors and mistakes is a necessity for a major organisation and movement, and failure to do this in time betokens, on the the weakness of an organisation.

The loss of creativity in the revolutionary struggle and the conservatism that comes with it must ultimately be transcended. Sectarianism is living life in a twisted way. The PKK has undoubtedly not descended into this. It can comfortably stay on its traditional path and the gains that will accrue from this cannot be despised. However, it is clear that this cannot be achieved simple confidence and established methods, but through the finding of the solution sooner or later...

The picture of the PKK in the indictment will of course not change. But the PKK is the free life not only of this nation but also of a new humanity. The fact that it gave birth to itself by force does not mean that that is the way it is going to grow up...

The PKK must bear in mind the great changes of the last quarter of a century and especially the actual change in the democratic structure of the Republic brought about by the Kurdish Question. The PKK should recognise that the Turkish legal system is under pressure, and make in its programme and principles the changes that are expected from it and are rendered necessary by these changes...

It should develop a political prog ramme based on the concepts of a democratic Republic and a common country. This means giving up the demands of the utopian period, which are no longer the only form freedom can take and, in any case, no longer work. It should opt instead for the notion of free union; and it should render this programme official at a conference as soon as possible. Both sides can transcend the impasse only in

It is clear that the Turkish Republic has entered into a period of great social and ideological democratisation. The PKK must recognise this, and respond by abandoning its programme, which is influenced to a large extent by the socialist systems of the 1970s and a dogmatic approach to the reality of Kurdish-Turkish relations.

The PKK should develop a prog ramme of democratic politics in Turkey as a whole and, on a deeper and more detailed level, in Kurdish society itself. Terrorism?

The Chief Prosecutor's Office accuses the PKK of terrorism. However, from the start to this present day many top civilian and military officials have referred to the phenomenon as a rebellion, have spoken of it in veiled terms as a guerrilla war or a medium or "low intensity war...

But we should abandon the language of propaganda. This conflict has involved a great deal of suffering and heavy losses on both sides. It has claimed the lives of 5,000 members of the security forces according to the official figure, of 20,000 members of the PKK, and 15,000 civilians. A combined death toll of 40,000. M than 3,000 villages have been evacuated and over three million people have been displaced. This war has involved the use of all types of aircraft, heavy artillery and tanks. 40-50,000 army personnel have been involved in confrontations lasting weeks at a time.

This cannot simply be called a stuggler against terrorism. It can only be scientifically designated as war. A comprehensive war that has lasted for

However, it is clear that a democratic upsurge is also taking place. More than twenty parties representing ever shade of opinion and social group have entered the last elections and everyone could vote. This is no small • International Viewpoint #315 October 1999 21

* Kurds & Turkey development from the point of view of democratisation. Kurds face a hard choice

Those Kurds who rebelled did so more out of local interests than to found a separate state. They were unable to go beyond the narrow framework of families and tribal authority pertaining to the ruling elite. From the start too, at least one group has been conciliatory.

Even if Kurdish nationalism has ultimately made a claim to separatism, in practice it has never had the intention, power or preparation to bring this about. In this sense, it has from the start condemned itself to being unable to find a solution. It seems to pursue separatism, but in the end it is the people who suffer when the state takes action. And this gives rise to a damaged, diseased social structure.

This in turn brings suspicion, fear, anxiety, ignorance and an increasing socio-economic backwardness with it. And as the state gets to see the Kurds as a people in a constant state of rebellion, going into exile becomes a feature of this society. It is as if everyone strives to get out of the region. The psychology of permanent rebellion is an expression of this social reality. A state cannot arise out of such a social structure. Neither its intellectual level, nor its geographical position, nor its economic state will permit it. A—A separate state

The alternative of a separate state is not a solution, either in terms of its concrete foundations or its benefits. In fact, of all alternatives, it has the least practical value. Even if it were to come into existence, it would not be recog nised by any of its neighbours and would not be recognised in the international arena. Such a state would need an economy, a language, social unity and defence, It lacks the foundations to remain in existence for even one day.

Despite full outside support, even autonomy is proving impossible for the Kurds in Northern Iraq. This is also 22 International Viewpoint #315 October 1999 partly due to their internal social structure. In this sense, the alternative of a separate state cannot be anything more than an ideological slogan for the Kurds. In the programme of the PKK, too, it is referred to as a matter of ideology. But practice and history have shownthe reality of union. The vital question is what sort of union this should be. B-Autonomy or federation

Alternatives such as a federation and autonomy can be implemented to some extent. They have some historic basis in the feudal and tribal structure in Kurdish areas. What is experienced in states where there is no democracy and what was formerly experienced under feudalism is mainly an ethnic and tribal autonomy. This has no national character. It is valid only within a narrow tribal framework.

Even in our day the BehdinanSoran distinction among Southern Kurds and autonomous structures base on this are not fully developed. Once again, the main reason is the power of

What the Kurds experienced in the Ottoman period, too, was pockets of intense feudal autonomy. Even rebellions always came into being when these pockets were threatened. In this sense, it is difficult to view these uprisings as movements based on the free will of the population. Their social structure and outlook would not have permitted their reaching such a state. Dynastic ideologies and tribal interests take precedence over everything.

Even today, autonomy and the concept of federation would be dependent on a backward social structure. They would not really allow for the development of democratic values. They would do more to strengthen feudal and tribal remnants. The experience of the Southern Kurds largely proves this. of

Furthermore, these are the forms most conducive to collaborationism and being a tool in the hands of whoever has the power to manipulate Kurds for their own interests. Because they have not evolved democratically, they are quite open to both traditional types of rebellion and destruction. Autonomy and federation have been much discussed, and there have been numerous attempts at autonomy. Experience suggests a quite critical attitude towards this type of solution...

As well as the existence of different dialects, the intermingling of Kurds and Turks, and the presence of at least as many Kurds in the west as there are in the east indicate that autonomy is not a practical option. Federation cannot be applied to the millions of Kurds in provinces like Istanbul, Izmir and Adana.

This type of population dispersal is found in many examples around the world and indicates that democratic notions regarding language and culture offer a better solution than regional solutions. People of various different ethnic origins are to be found living in close proximity in the same cities and regions, and this is a contemporary indication that the solution lies in the turning of democracy into an institution.

In any case, it is possible to derive greater benefits from the development of local administrations than those expected from autonomy.

The demographic distribution of Kurdish and Turkish populations is suitable neither for separation nor for federation. We need solutions that will lead to the strengthening of their union by means of the removal of the obstacles in the way of equality and freedom. From centuries of natural assimilation to the mutual daily functioning of the economic structure and social fluidity, everything constantly narrows the material basis of autonomy even further. C The democratic solution

In Switzerland, Belgium, Canada, the Republic of South America, New Zealand and even in the USA, despite regional, cultural, religious and linguistic differences, it is well known that the common good is based on a strong democratic state structure. Indeed they have achieved development by applying the principle

variety makes for power and wealth. The extreme point to which the bloodsoaked alternative can lead has been demonstrated most recently in Kosovo... Remnants of feudalism

The Kurdish people feel a heavy pressure from the existing feudalistic system. To eliminate this feudalistic system, true democracy is needed. The ethnic tribal system, religious sects and wealthy village owners are obstacles to democratisation. Feudalism, which by nature is not, democratic, gets its support from the state and contributes to the Kurdish problem by tolerating a totally non-democratic environment. Feudalism denies individualism and a free society. The people from these classes claim to espouse democracy but they are actually the ones responsible for the absence of democracy.

The latest PKK rebellion crushed a large part of authority enjoyed by this class. For this reason alone, the PKK movement should be considered a democratic revolution. There has been improvement in the area of individual freedoms.

The local people under the name of HADEP (Pro-Kurdish legal party), during the latest mayoral elections expressed themselves by electing their own mayoral candidates in various towns.

On behalf of democracy, the Kurds proved their existence. They proved that they could contribute to the improvement of democratisation in the country. Even this short explanation can prove that the Kurdish question can be resolved within the practicality of democracy...

We say; creating separate organisations to resolve the Kurdish problem is not needed. We say the problem is not political.

The solution to the problem is democratic unity of the state and integration of the Kurdish people. Since 1990 the State has recognised the local peoples cultural identity. A democratic solution to the Kurdish problem can gain momentum, and be seen as the only to solve the problem..

Language and cultural rights

The biggest obstacles are the restrictions on speaking the Kurdish language and recognition of Kurdish cultural rights. The government considered the political and cultural dimensions to be intertwined and this belief was the basis of the problem.

In Turkey, by prohibiting and obstructing these rights the people are forced to rebel and distance themselves from the state. The environment does not even provide healthy conditions for assimilation. Instead of curing a disease, they want to activate the

The state noticed this matter, and as of 1990 they permitted certain positive steps to be taken, such as broadcasting in Kurdish, lifting restrictions on the language, and permitting the foundation of Kurdish institutes. The function of the folklore associations is part of these positive steps. If these kinds of organisations are even slightly encouraged by the state, with their educational functions, they will contribute a great deal to the solution of the Kurdish problem...

One of the main deficiencies is the extent of illiteracy. There is no prohibition in the Constitution about reading and writing. It is only a matter of resources and education and these problems can easily be overcome. Setting up pre-schools, institutes and permitting the learning of Kurdish history and the Kurdish language at the Universities will contribute a great deal in resolving the Kurdish problem. These privileges already exist in other countries. In the age of technology it is not easy to forbid them.

The same thing is valid for radio and TV. Freedom in these areas is the most important element to a solution of the Kurdish problem.

We must educate the non-Kurdish public about the problem. Pre-schools should investigate history, language and culture through the education of the people. Permitting the publication of books and newspapers, and airing of radio and TV will help resolve the conflict.

Permitting this will not encourage

29ПN separatism; on the contrary, it will discourage separatism. The state will be stronger and individuals will develop a loyalty to it because they will feel a part of it. The world has many examples of this kind of diversity.

When Kurdish is permitted, Kurds will be more willing to learn and use the official Turkish language. Many Asian and African countries use English or French as their official language, but other languages are freely used, by the original inhabitants and immigrants. Their peoples speak two, sometimes three languages while remaining loyal to their country...

When Turkey institutes a new policy permitting Kurdish rights, she will not need to be afraid of Kurds in neighbouring countries anymore because she will have already provided its own people with their rights. Contrariwise, this step will contribute to the democratisation of the region and will gain the support of the peoples of neighbouring countries.

A democratic solution to the Kurdish issue will have a great impact on the Middle East. The negative policies to date have had a negative impact on unity and progress. Resolving the problem by these methods will bring peace, democracy, unity and progress to Turkey. It will be proof that we will not have to experience once again the past sorrows and disappearances... i Abandon the military approach

Historical experience proves that a violent approach to a problem inflames the problem. In the beginning, violence may help to put the problem on the table. More violence, however, brings more destruction and sorrow and in the end a peaceful solution cannot be avoided. Kosovo is the latest case. Earlier Chechnya, Palestine and El Salvador were good examples.

The PKK's rebellion using its own methods, and leading the movement as a military force was legitimate. In 1990, it could have changed its approach from military to non-violent and it might have succeeded. If the government had accepted the PKK's

International Viewpoint #315 October 1999 23

the Communist Party of the Philippines.

Links between activists in the two countries are steadily improving

* Kurds/Philippines 1993 unilateral cease-fire, it would have been a turning point. After 1993, with the Government's rejection of the cease-fire, violence increased on both sides and more destruction resulted. At times the violence moved beyond the principles of war...

In the indictment it is stated that I was responsible for the death of 33 unarmed soldiers and some civilians. They neglected to mention, however, who was responsible for the destruction of over 3 000 villages and the disappearance of thousands of people from the Kurdish regions...

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