The Turkish left
Of course, the army doesn't like the "populism" of the MHP, or its mafia connections. And it is still a little too Muslim-conservative for the generals' taste. But they could certainly tolerate the MHP as partners, particularly if the economic crisis leads to a social explosion.
The "grey wolves" could be useful
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"auxiliaries" for the repressive forces. The youth wing of the MHP have a formidable street-fighting capacity. They use knives, sometimes guns, to intimidate left-wing students.
The fascist hordes are also very "effective" in intimidating Kurdish militants—when PKK leader "Apo" Oçalan was arrested, the "grey wolves" HADEP is ready to deal with the coalition government, despite the presence of the far-right
An ambiguous victory After 50 years of right-wing rule, and three coups d'Etat, the Turkish left is in power. But don't i expect any radical changes... The Democratic Left Party (DSP)' won most working-class votes in the larger towns. Their candidates included many trade union leaders (including the president of DYSK).3 But the party is nationalist-populist, rather than social democratic. It has less organic links to the working class than its Greek alter ego, PASOK. In fact, DSP is an exclusively electoral machine, with little real implantation or significant membership structures. It draws its support from a wide section of the population, including some more progressive i Islamic associations.
Most social democratic cadres are in the rival Republican Peoples Party (CHP), which dominated the left until 1995. But Deniz Baykal's right-wing line and manoeuvres alientated so many voters that the party fell below the 10% hurdle, and has no seats in the new parliament. Baykal has now resigned, and the party is suffering a deep identity crisis
The overall score of the DSP and CHP (31%) is 5% higher than in 1995, but does not represent an increase in the left's long-term share of the vote. And both parties are more right-wing
The Kurdish national movement is also abandoning its left-wing origins, with voters now split between the left-nationalist HADEP* and the Islamic fundamentalists (FP). HADEP won 4.7% of the total vote, and 45% in the Kurdish capital, Diyarbakir. Despite a very unfavourable climate, the party increased its share of the vote by 0.5% (300,000 votes). The party was very disappointed by its results in Istanbul (3.4%), and other west-Turkish towns where half the Kurdish population is now concentrated.
Since parties must win 10% of the total Turkish vote to enter parliament, HADEP's 28 seats were distributed between the right-wing parties-which scored very badly in the Kurdish regions.
But HADEP won control of thirty Kurdish towns, including Diyarbakir and the seven main towns in South-east Turkey. Because HADEP boycotted the 1994 municipal elections, the Islamic fundamentalists had won control of most Kurdish towns.
These (re)conquered town halls will play a key role in Kurdish politics. According to Diyarbakir's new mayor, Feridun Çelik,
Turkish MHP. "Sometimes the extremes understand each other better than the others." Disappointed far left
Despite a dynamic and inspiring campaign, the Freedom and Solidarity Party (ÖDP) attracted only 250,000 votes (0.8%). Opinion polls suggested 5-8% support for the party in Istanbul, but on election day most of preferred "useful" vote for the DSP or CHP, which they expected to pass the 10% barrier and enter parliament. Many felt this was the best way to oppose the Islamic fundamentalists and far-right.
The ÖDP presented candidates in all 90 provinces (except the seven major Kurdish towns, where it has no active presence). It now controls four small town halls, and has a number of municipal counsellors. [ET] * Notes 1. Founded by Bülent Ecevit, charismatic leader of the CHP in the 1970s (see note three). After the 1980 coup, Ecevit left his former comrades, and created the more nationalist and conservative DSP in 1985. 2. Turkish Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions. Much weaker and more moderate than in the 19705, when it led the labour movement. Violently repressed by the 1980 coup d'Etat. 3. Founded by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the CHP was an essential actor in the creation of the Turkish Republic in 1923. Fiercely jacobin and kemalist, the party " turned left" in the early 1970s, and joined the Socialist (lInd) International. The party won 8.7% of votes in the April 1999 election. 4. Peoples Democracy Party-close to the PKK. Founded in 1994, after HEP and DEP were dissolved by Turkey's Constitutional Court. 5. Regroupment of far-left currents, including Yeniyol Turkish section of the 4th International. About 40,000 members.
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* Kurds & Turkey violently attacked protesters from the Kurdish political party HADEP. Growing nationalism
The vote for the MHP reflects the growth of an ethnic Turkish nationalism, in reaction to the Kurdish national movement. Indiscriminate PKK attacks have contributed to a "security" hysteria which the MHP successfully exploited.
The party's best electoral results come from the towns which provided most of the ethnic Turkish victims of the conflict. And half of the party's voters are young men (under 25)for whom military service in the Kurdish zones is a life-shaping experience.
Turkish nationalism has also been boosted by European (especially German) arrogance, and the rejection of Turkey's application to join the European Union.
Turkey agreed to a customs union with the EU, but Greece still blocks the financial package which was supposed to smooth the economic consequences for the weaker partner.
1 Turkish media suggest that the country is "surrounded"; there is a "trilateral alliance" between Greece, Iran and Armenia; Russia and Syria are "chronically hostile"; the USA wants to control the Middle East and the Caucasus; nationalism and war are spreading in the Balkans; and the Europeans are "an anti-Turk bloc" on the Kurdish and Cyprus questions.
More and more people are afraid that, after Yugoslavia, Turkey will be the next victim of a Western "solution" of ethnico-political conflicts. [JD] * Republic and, above all, it cannot be regarded as defending it...
PKK statements)
"I expected the death sentence,"
PKK leader
Apo Ocalan told his
Turkish judges. "But the real politica process starts now."